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EQUALITY RIGHTS AND
SEXUAL ORIENTATION:
CONFRONTING HETEROSEXUAL
FAMILY PRIVILEGE*
Bruce Ryder**
Heterosexual married couples are supported by a wide array of legal privileges,
benefits, rights and powers. Recently, these legal advantages-which include, but are
not limited to, economic support such as tax and pension benefits - have been
extended in some areas to unmarried cohabiting heterosexual couples. Where the law
continues to extend advantages to married couples not available to unmarried
couples, heterosexual couples can choose to "opt in" to these advantages by marrying.
Persons in same-sex relationships, by contrast, have no choice in the matter- they
are excluded from the definition of "spouse" and their relationships are legal nullities
upon which no legal privileges, benefits, rights or powers are conferred. At the same
time, s.15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees equal rights to
lesbians and gays. Vie existence and persistence of this contradictory legal situation
can be traced to a compassion/condonation dichotomy in dominant legal attitudes
towards gay men and lesbians. The compassion/condonation discursive framework
functions to rationalize heterosexism by placing heterosexual privilege beyond criti-
cal examination. Until legal decision-makers are willing to confront and dismantle
the legal construction of heterosexual privilege, and abandon time "compassion with-
out condonation" approach, there will be neither freedom nor equality of sexual
identity.
Les couples marijs hterosexuels jouissent d'une gamme 9tendue de privihiges,
d'avantages, de droits et de pouvoirs confirs par la loi. Dernirement ces avantages,
qui comprennent, sans y 6tre limit~s, une aide dconomique, commne les avantages
fiscaux et les pensions ou rentes de retraite, ont 6te tendus, dans certains domaines,
aux couples hIdtrosexuels non marids quivivent naritalement ensemble. Dans les cas
ot la loi attribue aux couples maries des avantages auxquels les couples non maris
n'ont pas acc~s, les couples hiterosexuels peuvent choisir de les recevoir en se ma-
riant. Par contre, les personnes de mnme sexe qui vivent mnaritalement n'ont pas ce
choix. Leurs rapports sont considris comme nuls devant la loi et aucun privilege,
avantage, droit ou pouvoir ne leur est donc conf&J juridiquemnent. Cependant, l'in-
terprdtation donne a1 l'article 15 de La Charte des droits et libertds garantit des
droits jgauxaux lesbiennes et aux homosexuels. On peut faire remonter l 'existence et
la persistance de cettesituation juridique contradictoire a la dichotomie des positions
* The author wishes to thank Annie Bunting, Mary Jane Mossman, Lee Waldorf
and the students in the Sexuality and the Law seminar at Osgoode Hall Law
School for their insights and support. He would also like to thank Nitya Duclos
and Joel Bakan for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
** Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School
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juridiques dominantes sur la question des homosexuels et des lesbiennes. Les posi-
tions inconsistantes de la "compassion d'ordre humanitaire, mais de la rdprobation
morale" ont comme consequence de rationaliser l'"hdtdrosexisme" en plaqant le privi-
lPge hdtirosexuel au-dessus d'un examen critique. Jusqu'd ce que les autoritis en
matire de Idgislation soient pretes a prendre de front l'interprdtation juridique du
privilege hdtdrosexuel pour la ddmanteler et a abandonner cette approche de cornpas-
sion humanitaire et de rdprobation morale, il ne pourra y avoir ni libertd ni dgalit'
d'identitd sexuelle.
An interesting item appeared recently in Miss Manners' syndicated news-
paper column. Manners (not her real name) answers questions from
readers on those troublesome details of correct tablesetting, wedding
plans, and other matters of etiquette. A concerned mother had written for
advice regarding how to handle invitations to her daughter's wedding to
another woman. Manners replied that she should invite only those friends
and relatives who wish the couple well, just as one would for a heterosex-
ual marriage. But please, Miss Manners informed her reader, you should
not call the ceremony a wedding when it "is actually not a wedding". She
suggested that the invitations "refer to the event as a church blessing or a
union, rather than as a wedding or a marriage."'
In the United Kingdom, lesbian and gay teachers have been struggling
with other activists at the local level for more than a decade to foster
policies and an educational curriculum condemning heterosexism and re-
flecting positive attitudes towards lesbians and gays. Yet the Conservative
Party announced at its 1986 Conference that it would introduce legislation
prohibiting the promotion of homosexuality. Section 28 of the Local Govern-
ment Act 1988 provides that "a local authority shall not intentionally pro-
mote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting
homosexuality," nor shall it "promote the teaching in any maintained
[publicly funded] school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pre-
tended family relationship."'2
In 1989, public funding of artists whose work included homoerotic sub-
jects developed into a controversial issue in the United States. Congress
passed an amendment to its appropriations bill for the National Endow-
ment for the Arts that would bar the use of federal funds to "promote,
disseminate or produce obscene materials including but not limited to
depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of
I Toronto Star (6 October 1989) C5.
2 Local Government Act 1988 (U.K), c.9, s.28. For a discussion, see J. Weeks, Sex,
Politics and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality Since 1800, 2d ed. (London: Long-
man, 1989).
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children, or individuals engaged in sex acts." 3 The Canadian Secretary of
State Women's Program has similar funding guidelines that render inelig-
ible all individuals and groups "whose primary purpose is to promote a
view on abortion or sexual orientation". 4
Saskatchewan Minister of Social Services Grant Schmidt has stated that
"[in no way do I want people who follow homosexual practices ... show-
ing a public example to my children.. ." and "Itireating homosexual
couples as families is contrary to the rules of Allah, God, the Holy Spirit
..."5 In 1988, Saskatchewan Premier Grant Devine compared gay M.P.
Svend Robinson and other gays and lesbians to "bank robbers". The pre-
mier offered the following assessment of members of parliament who are
bank robbers: "I still have compassion for them but I don't condone the
activity."6
According-to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force's annual survey
of hate crimes, there were more than 7,000 reported incidents of violence,
vandalism and harassment of gay and lesbian people in the United States
in 1989. About two-thirds of the incidents were verbal harassment; of the
remaining 2,322 incidents, 34% were physical assaults; 31% were threats of
violence; 17% were acts of vandalism; 14% were police abuse; 3% were
homicides; and 1% were arson or other acts of victimization.7 In a 1984
3 P.L. 101-121, (1989) 103 Stat. 701 at 741. For an analysis of the impact of the law,
see Vance, "Misunderstanding Obscenity" (May 1990) 78"5 Art in America 49.
4 See Report of the Standing Committee on Secretary of State, Fairness in Funding,
in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Secretary
of State, Issue No. 28, May26,1987 at 15; Ross, "Heterosexuals Only Need Apply:
The Secretary of State's Regulation of Lesbian Existence" (1988) 17:3 Resources
for Feminist Research 35; Ross, "Launching Lesbian Cultural Offensives" (1988)
17:2 Resources for Feminist Research 12; Bociurkiw, "Territories of the Forbid-
den: Lesbian Culture, Sex and Censorship" (April 1988) 49 Fuse 27.
5 Quoted in Briarpatch (October 1989) at 18.
6 Ibid.
7 "Task Force Calls Anti-Gay Biag Widespread" [Toronto] Globe and Mail (8 June
1990) A15. See also Sagarin and MacNamara, "The Homosexual as a Crime
Victim" in L Drapkin and E. Viano eds., Victimology: A New Focus (Lexington,
MA: Heath and Co., 1975) 73; Harry, "Derivative Deviance: The Cases of Extor-
tion, Fag-Bashing, and Shakedown of Gay Men" (1982) 19 Criminology 546;
Miller and Humphreys, "Lifestyles and Violence: Homosexual Victims of As-
sault and Murder" (1980) 3 Qualitative Soc. 169; van den Boogaard, "Blood
Furious Underneath the Skins... On Anti-Homosexual Violence: Its Nature and
the Needs of the Victims" in D. Altman et al., Homosexuality, Which Homosex-
uality? (London: GMP Publishers, 1989) 49; M. Kaufman, "The Construction of
Masculinity and the Triad of Men's Violence", in M. Kaufman ed., Beyond Patri-
archy: Essays by Men on Pleasure, Power and Change (Toronto: Oxford University
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study by the Task Force, one in five gay men and one in ten lesbians
reported being physically assaulted because of their sexual orientation.8
Statistics on anti-gay or anti-lesbian hate crimes are not available in Can-
ada, but there is little doubt that, as in the United States, lesbians and gays
are frequently the victims of verbal, physical and sexual assault because of
their sexuality.9 In 1985, Kenn Zeller was killed by five teenage boys intent
on "beating up a fag" in High Park in Toronto.' 0 In 1989, Joe Rose was
stabbed to death by a group of young men on a Montreal bus. The men
taunted Rose by shouting "faggot" before stabbing him with scissors and
knives."
In the United States, the Hate Crime Statistics Act, which has been intro-
duced in Congress every year since 1984, was finally passed into law on
April 23, 1990.12 The Act requires the Attorney General to collect data
"about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion,
sexual orientation, or ethnicity". The legislation had been stalled for years
in part as a result of charges by legislators that compiling statistics on anti-
lesbian and anti-gay violence amounts to a "subtle affirmation of homosex-
Press, 1987) 1. The continuum of violence against those who fail to conform to
dominant sexual norms extends back to the burning of "witches" and "faggots"
at the stake, and to the execution of thousands of lesbians and gays during the
Holocaust. See R. Plant, The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War Against Homosexuals
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1986).
8 Editors of the Harvard Law Review, Sexual Orientation and the Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1990) at 31.
9 See The Coalition for Gay Rights in Ontario, Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gay Men: The Ontario Human Rights Omission (October 1986); Sepejak, The Will-
ingness of Homosexuals to Report Criminal Victimization to Police (MA Thesis,
Department of Criminology, University of Toronto, 1979). See also the Report of
the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights, Equality for All (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1985) at 26:
We were shocked by a number of the experiences of unfair treatment related to
us by homosexuals in different parts of the country. We heard about the
harassment of and violence committed against homosexuals. We were told in
graphic detail about physical abuse and psychological oppression suffered by
homosexuals. In several cities, private social clubs serving a homosexual clien-
tele were damaged and the members harassed. Hate propaganda directed at
homosexuals has been found in some parts of Canada.
10 Lesk, Popert and Taylor, "Boys Will Be Boys" The Body Politic (January 1986) 13;
Shein, "Gay Bashing in High Park: A Tale of Homophobia and Murder" Toronto
Life (April 1986).
11 Jones, "AIDS Activist Murdered in Montreal" Rites (May 1989).
12 Pub. L. No. 101-275 (1990).
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uality".13 Senator Jesse Helms sponsored efforts in the Senate to exclude
sexual orientation from the categories of discrimination warranting inves-
tigation.'4 That having failed, he proposed an amendment stating that "the
homosexual movement threatens the strength and the survival of the
American family as the basic unit of society". 5 In the end, Senators settled
for an addition to the Bill which states that "American family life is the
foundation of American society" and should be encouraged in the schools
and by federal policy. The amendment further states that "nothing in this
Act shall be construed, nor shall any funds appropriated to carry out the
purpose of this Act be used, to promote or encourage homosexuality."' 6
As these examples illustrate, gay men and lesbians are constantly ex-
posed to intolerance, condescension, marginalization, hatred and violence.
The remarks of Premier Devine, Senator Helms and others represent the
most common response of heterosexually-identified people to the strug-
gles of lesbians and gays for equality: compassion for or tolerance of the
misguided souls, yes; promotion or condonation of "their lifestyle", never.
The manner in which Canadian legislators and judges have responded
to homosexuality can be understood in terms of the compassion/
condonation dichotomy. The compassionate approach is evident in the
belief, held by a strong majority of Canadians, that it should be illegal to
deprive an individual of access to housing, employment and services
solely because of his or her sexual orientation.17 The belief that gays and
lesbians should have legal protection from discrimination is now en-
shrined in the human rights legislation of Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and
the Yukon, and in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. At the
same time, the "no condonation" approach is manifest in the wide range of
overtly discriminatory laws and policies that provide material and ideo-
logical support to heterosexuality. Canadian law has consistently failed to
provide any such support to gays and lesbians.
The compassion/condonation dichotomy provides the discursive
framework through which the social and legal construction of heterosexual
'3 Editors of the Harvard Law Review, supra note 8 at 167, note 36 (quoting Repre-
sentative Dannemeyer).
14 Ibid. at 167.
'- 136 Cong. Rec. (February 8, 1990) (Debate on S1169-01).
16 Supra note 12.
'7 A September 1985 Gallup Poll found that 70% of Canadians favoured making
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation illegal. See the Coalition for Gay
Rights of Ontario, supra note 9 at 23.
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privilege is placed beyond critical examination.18 On the one hand, if het-
erosexual privilege is socially and legally constructed, it can be socially and
legally dismantled. On the other hand, heterosexually-identified people
can avoid confronting their privilege by viewing heterosexuality as a norm
dictated by biology or nature. The flip-side of the "normal" heterosexual is,
of course, the "abnormal" homosexual. For many years, homosexuality
was treated as a pathology of the soul, leading to criminalization; later, as a
pathology of the body or mind, leading to medicalization. The criminal and
medical models have been discredited, but the tendency to believe that
biology or nature has somehow failed the homosexual remains. She or he
deserves our compassion for this trick of fate.
The refusal to condone homosexuality is more difficult to understand,
for if sexuality is "natural", it is beyond social control or human agency.
The importance attached to not condoning homosexuality, then, represents
an awareness that sexuality is, at least in part, within the control of individ-
uals or society. Rather than deploying this awareness to critically examine
the social construction of heterosexual privilege, it is used to portray gays
and lesbians as a threat to the "natural" order of heterosexuality. In this
way, the "no condonation" approach functions in tandem with the com-
passion model to rationalize heterosexual supremacy and keep gays and
lesbians in their (subordinate) place. Heterosexuality, in the compassion/
condonation discursive framework, is paradoxically both a "natural" and
an artificial institution, vulnerable to the conferral of social and legal sup-
port to other sexualities.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the many ways in which the law
disadvantages gays and lesbians, and then to consider whether the guaran-
tee of equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms can change this situation
18 For works undertaking a critical examination of the social construction of sexu-
ality, see M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (New
York: Vintage, 1980); Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Exis-
tence" (1980) 5 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 631; C. MacKin-
non, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1989) 126-154; G. Kinsman, The Regulation of Desire: Sexuality in Canada (Montreal:
Black Rose Books, 1987); M. Valverde, Sex, Power and Pleasure (Toronto: Women's
Press, 1985); Weir and Casey, "Subverting Power in Sexuality" (1984) 14 Socialist
Review 139; Rubin, "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality" in C. Vance ed., Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality (Bos-
ton: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984) 267; J. Weeks, supra note 2; J. Weeks,
Sexuality and Its Discontents: Meanings, Myths and Modern Sexualities (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); H. Buchbinder ed., Who's On Top? The Politics
of Heterosexuality (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987); G. Hanscombe and M.
Humphries eds., Heterosexuality (London: GMP, 1987); Gay Left Collective ed.,
Homosexuality: Power and Politics (London: Allison and Busby, 1980).
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and thus move Canadian law beyond the "compassion without condona-
tion" approach to lesbian and gay existences.
In Part 1, 1 outline an array of laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. The state has favoured one family form over others, namely a
family composed of a father, a mother and their dependent children. This
idealized family form does not accurately describe the way most people
live,19 but it is the family form that is materially and ideologically sup-
ported by the law. That it is now challenged as an ideal is reflected in the
fact that it can no longer be referred to simply as "the family". Rather, a host
of adjectives are employed to distinguish this family from others. One
might refer to it as the patriarchal, nuclear or heterosexual family, depend-
ing upon whether one wanted to distinguish it from an egalitarian, ex-
tended, gay or lesbian family respectively. Defenders of the ideological
hegemony of this family form tend to refer to it as the traditional family. I
will refer to the family composed of the married father and mother living
with their children as the "privileged" or "heterosexual" family to empha-
size both the legal support that has been given to this family form and the
exclusion of gays and lesbians from its legal definition.
I will focus in this paper on the discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation inherent in the legal conferral of material, psychic and symbolic
support to heterosexual relationships only. Same-sex couples are deprived
of the material and psychic benefits granted by the law exclusively to
heterosexual couples, and all lesbians and gays are stigmatized by the
state's refusal to confer legitimacy on economically, emotionally and sexu-
ally interdependent relationships between persons of the same sex. View-
ing heterosexual family privilege through the lens of sexual orientation
discrimination leads me to focus on arguments for the removal of the legal
disadvantage of same-sex couples relative to their heterosexual counter-
parts.
It should be recognized that according the same benefits to same-sex
19 According to Statistics Canada, 77w Family in Canada: Selected Highlights (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, January 1989), 32.7% of families in Canada are husband-wife
families with no children at home, 12.7% are lone-parent families (80% of which
are headed by women), and the number of common law heterosexual unions
increased by over 35% between 1981 and 1986. Cohabiting lesbian and gay
couples without children do not fall within Statistics Canada's definition of
family, and are therefore not accounted for in the data. See also M. Eichler,
Families in Canada Today (Toronto: Gage, 1988); G.N. Ramu ed., Marriage and the
Family in Canada Today (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1988); Boyd, "Changing
Canadian Family Forms: Issues for Women" in N. Mandell and A. Duffy eds.,
Reconstructing the Canadian Family: Feminist Perspectives (Toronto: Buttenvorths,
1988).
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couples as are currently granted to heterosexual couples may further en-
trench the privilege of coupled (nuclear) family units at the expense of
other familial arrangements. 20 Indeed, treating individuals living alone or
in groups differently from persons living as couples or in nuclear families
when their needs are the same may constitute discrimination on the basis
of family status or marital status. An evolving human rights jurisprudence
is establishing the principle that rules cannot be based upon distinctions
drawn upon the marital or family status of an individual without a consid-
eration of his or her actual needs, capacities or merits.21 Like prohibitions
on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, prohibitions on marital
status or family status discrimination have profound implications for the
current array of laws and policies that privilege the married heterosexual
family. Untangling the network of discrimination based on family status,
marital status and sexual orientation that is bound up in the legal construc-
tion of heterosexual family privilege will be the topic of a subsequent
paper. For the moment, I will examine heterosexual family privilege
through the lens of sexual orientation discrimination, with a consequent
focus on the legal disadvantage of lesbian and gay couples.
In Part II, I discuss the attitudes that lesbians and gays have confronted
when they have placed their rights on the legislative agenda. In Part III, I
turn to a consideration of section 15 of the Charter and evaluate its poten-
tial to promote equality for gays and lesbians. And in Part IV, I briefly
examine some positive recent decisions expanding the definition of family
beyond its traditional form to include cohabiting lesbian and gay couples.
I
Canadian legislation stigmatizes lesbian and gay existences by exclu-
sion. Most often this exclusion is accomplished by silence. Lesbians and
gays are omitted, ignored. For example, many laws employ the word
"spouse" to allocate rights, powers, benefits and responsibilities to family
20 See Cox, "Choosing One's Family: Can the Legal System Address the Breadth of
Women's Choice of Intimate Relationship?" (1989) 8 St. Louis Univ. Pub. L. Rev.
299; Cox, "Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through
Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining" (1986) 2 Wis. Women's L.J. 1.
21 Brossard v. Quebec (Comm. des Droits de la Personne), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 279 at 298
(municipality's blanket anti-nepotism policy discriminated on the basis of civil
status); Cashin v. C.B.C., (1988) 86 N.R. 24 (F.C.A.); Re Saskatchewan Human Rights
Commission et al. v. Government of Saskatchewan Department of Social Services,
(1988) 52 D.L.R. (4th) 253 (Sask. C.A.) (lower welfare benefits to single persons
constitutes discrimination on the basis of marital status under the provincial
human rights code); Schaap v. Canada, (1988) 56 D.L.R. (4th) 105 (F.C.A.) (em-
ployer's policy of granting family accommodation only to married couples (at
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members. In Ontario alone, over seventy acts employ the word "spouse".
Some statutes define "spouse" as either of a man or a woman who are
married to each other. In the absence of a legislative definition, judges rely
on "common understandings" and dictionary definitions to interpret
spouse as meaning a married heterosexual person. 22 In recent years, the
definition of spouse in many acts has been amended to accord legal status
to unmarried heterosexuals cohabiting in a relationship of some perma-
nence.23 In no case has the legislative recognition of unmarried cohabita-
tion extended to same-sex partners. Canadian law continues to define
spouse uniformly in heterosexually-exclusive terms.
The legal exclusion of gays and lesbians operates on a number of levels.
On an ideological level, it constructs heterosexuality as the norm and gays
and lesbians as deviant. Despite the prevalent ideology of there being one
natural, private family form (namely the nuclear, heterosexual family), and
the ideology of heterosexuality as the natural, private sexual identity, these
institutions are in fact largely shaped and defined by law. The amount of
legal architecture that has gone into building the ideal family and support-
ing heterosexuality is staggering-hundreds of pieces of legislation, thou-
sands of regulations, rules, by-laws and judicial decisions. This plethora of
government activity promotes the idea that there is only one legitimate
sexual identity, only one legitimate family form, and thus ensures that all
those people living outside these legally and ideologically created norms
are constructed as deviant.24
115) "perpetuates a stereotype, namely, that a relationship between a man and a
woman has a lesser social value if it does not have the status of marriage ... It is a
commonplace that the existence of the marriage bond is no guarantee of the
permanency and stability of a relationship, just as its absence is no sure indicator
of a mere passing fancy.").
22 E.g., Andrews v. Ontario (Ministry of Health), (1988) 64 O.R. (2d) 258 (Ont. H. C.);
Cummings v. Fleming, [1980] 4 W.W.R 688 (B.C.S.C.); Louis v. Esslinger, (1981) 121
D.L.R. (3d) 17 (B.C.S.C.); Trowsdale v. McDonald, (1980) 20 B.C.L.RI 1 (B.C.S.C.);
No. 673 v. M.N.R., 60 D.T.C. 21; Schapira v. M.N.R., 66 D.T.C. 157; Sokil v. M.N.R.,
68 D.T.C. 314; The Queen v. Taylor, 84 D.T.C. 6234; The Queen v. Scheller, [19751
C.T.C. 601; Toutant v. M.N.R., [1978] C.T.C. 2671; Fraser v. Haight et al., (1987) 58
O.R. (2d) 676 (H. Ct.), aff'd 69 O.R. (2d) 64n (C.A.); Miron v. Trudel, (1990) 71 O.R
(2d) 662.
23 See, e.g., the Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 1986, c.64.
24 See S. Gavigan, "Law, Gender and Ideology", in A. Bayefsky ed., Legal Theory
Meets Legal Practice (Edmonton: Academic Printers and Publishing, 1988) 293-4;
C. Smart, The Tes that Bind: Law, Marriage and the Reproduction of Patriarchal
Relations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984) 221; Barrett and McIntosh,
The Anti-Social Family (London: Verso Editions, 1982) 77; Mossman and Mac-
Lean, "Family Law and Social Welfare" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fain. L. 79 at 104-7.
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More concretely, the law is a source of material and psychic oppression
for gays and lesbians. Gays and lesbians are deprived of the advantages
and powers afforded by laws aimed at improving the emotional and mate-
rial security of heterosexual family units. The state has not concerned itself
with the well-being of gays and lesbians coping with old age, the break-
down of a relationship, or the death or injury of a partner. As a result of the
legal deprivation of resources and powers, these events are likely to pro-
duce greater emotional and material vulnerability in the lives of gays and
lesbians than they do for heterosexuals.
As we shall see, there are two sides to the material inequality of gays and
lesbians created by the law. First, in aggregate, gay men and lesbians are
paying more tax than heterosexuals. Secondly, gay men and lesbians re-
ceive less in public benefits, since they get nothing in return for their
contributions in terms of survivors' benefits, family employment benefits
or spousal pension benefits. In other words, gays and lesbians are being
forced to subsidize heterosexual privilege.
A summary of laws which institutionalize heterosexuality and discrimi-
nate against gays and lesbians follows. The examples of legal discrimina-
tion in provincial areas of jurisdiction are drawn from Ontario legislation,
but could just as easily have been compiled in any other province.
A. Legislation Conferring Economic Benefits or Obligations
1. Pension Benefits
Many statutes provide opposite-sex spousal pension benefits to elderly
persons generally and to various sectors of public employees. 25 For exam-
ple, the federal Old Age Security Act provides for spousal pension benefits
where one spouse is over 65, the other is between 60 and 64 and the
couple's income is less than $16,000. Benefits are available to heterosexual
couples who have lived together for a year or more, but not to same sex
couples. Jim Egan and John Nesbit, a gay couple who have lived together
for over 40 years but were denied a spousal pension, have launched a
Charter challenge to the legislation in the British Columbia Supreme Court,
arguing that it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.26
25 E.g., War Veterans Allowance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.W-3, s.2(3)(a); Canada Pension Plan
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-8, s.64; Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.O-9; Public Service
Superannuation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.P-36, s.25; Legislative Assembly Retirement Al-
lowances Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.236, s.11; Teachers' Pension Act, 1989, S.O. 1989, c.92,
s.67.
26 "Homosexual Couple to Sue Over Benefits", [Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 August
1988); "Challenging the Charter", Angles (October 1988) 12-3.
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2. Other Family Employment Benefits
Occasionally legislation relating to public employees sets out the range
of family benefits that can be provided to heterosexual family members.2"
More frequently, the scope of family benefits available to employees, such
as dental and medical plans, is determined by the individual employment
contract or collective agreement. Unions and employee groups across the
country are starting to insist that contract language ensure that family-
related benefits be provided on an equal basis to employees with same-sex
partners.28 Gay men and lesbians are asserting their right to equal family
benefits through grievance procedures, human rights complaints and court
challenges, so far without success.29
3. Benefits Conferred on Death or Injury of a Family Member
Many statutes provide benefits or rights in crisis situations such as the
death, injury or sickness of a heterosexual family member. Thus, in addi-
tion to the deprivation of public financial assistance, gays and lesbians are
deprived of the empowering rights that members of privileged families
would take for granted in responding to family emergencies. For example,
gays and lesbians are always at risk of being left out of decisions regarding
a partner's health care if she or he is incapacitated. 0
27 E.g., Education Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.129, s.155(l)(a); Municipal Act, RIS.O. 1980,
c.302, s.208, para.48.
28 Canadian Human Rights Advocate (March/April 1990) 3; "Gay Couples Step Up
Fight to Get Paid Medical Benefits" Toronto Star (27 October 1989) D10; "BC Prof
Wins Spousal Benefits" Xtra! (April 1990) XS3.
29 Mossop v. Canada (Secretary of State), (1989) 10 C.H.RR. D/6064 (denial of be-
reavement leave to attend funeral of gay partner's father discriminates on the
basis of family status), set aside in A.-G. of Canada v. Mossop, Unreported decision
of the Federal Court of Appeal, June 29, 1990 (Court file A-199-89); Vogel v.
Government of Manitoba, (1983) 4 C.H.RR. D/1654 (denial of dental benefits to
gay partner of government employee does not amount to discrimination on the
basis of marital status or sex); Re Carleton University and C.U.P.E., Local 2424,
(1989) 35 L.A.C. (3d) 96 (denial of spousal benefits to same-sex partners does not
constitute discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); "Ottawa, Union
Accused of Discrimination" [Torontol Globe and Mail (26 August 1989) A12; "Van-
couver Lesbian Launches Bias Complaint Against Feds" Xtra! (April 1990) XS1.
30 In Ontario, regulations under the Public Hospitals Act give a spouse the right to
consent to surgery if the individual is incapable of making the decision. See
O.Reg.518/88, s.25. For a particularly heartbreaking story of a lesbian cut off
from her disabled lover, see In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861
(Minn. App. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1467; K Thompson andJ. Andrzejewski,
Why Can't Sharon Kowalski Come Home? (San Francisco: Spinsters/Aunt Lute,
1988).
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Unlike cohabiting heterosexuals, gays and lesbians cannot claim a
spousal pension or survivor's benefits pursuant to workers' compensation
legislation if their partners are killed in workplace accidents. 31 Similarly,
only cohabiting or married heterosexuals can apply for dependants' bene-
fits if their partners die as a result of criminal acts. 32 The exclusion of gays
and lesbians in this context is all the more unforgivable given that they
have an increased risk of being the victims of violent crime.33
Gays, lesbians and their children face a greater risk of economic losses
arising from automobile accidents than heterosexuals. Whether a person
injured in an automobile accident will be able to recover benefits under
compulsory automobile insurance contracts depends, in some circum-
stances, on whether the claimant falls within statutory definitions of family
members of the insured. For example, in Ontario, an uninsured person
injured by an uninsured vehicle or while an occupant of an uninsured
vehicle can recover benefits if she or he is the spouse of an insured, or a
dependent relative of either the insured or the insured's spouse.34 Until
recently, in the absence of a definition of "spouse" in the legislation, the-
Ontario courts had held that only married spouses were included.35 How-
ever, in a recent decision, Leroux v. Co-operators General Insurance Co.,36
Madam Justice Arbour held that this definition of spouse must be inter-
preted in a manner consistent with the Charter. She found that denying a
child's claim against the insurance company based solely on his mother's
non-marital relationship with the insured man constituted discrimination
on the basis of marital status. 37 The Charter required that the word
"spouse" be interpreted to include "persons who live in a relationship of
some permanence and commitment, akin to a conjugal relationship. 38
Although this case involved a heterosexual couple, the reasoning should
be equally applicable to a cohabiting same-sex couple.
Under the no-fault provisions of Ontario's standard automobile insur-
31 Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.539, s.36 as am. by S.O. 1984, c.58 and
S.O. 1986, c.64, s.69.
32 Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.82 as am. by S.O. 1986, c.64,
s.5(1).
33 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
34 Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.218, s.231(2)(b)(iii).
35 Fraser v. Haight, supra note 22; Miron v. Trudel, supra note 22.
36 65 D.L.R. (4th) 702 (Ont. H. Ct.).
37 Ibid. at 714.
38 Ibid. at 716. See also Matheson v. Matheson, (1988) 25 B.C.L.R. (2d) 351 (B.C.S.C.)
(basing right to indemnity on marital status violates s.15 of the Charter).
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ance policies, death benefits are payable to the head of the household or the
spouse of the head of the household in which the deceased resided.39 The
statutory definition of spouse includes cohabiting heterosexuals. Although
"the obvious purpose of [death benefits] would seem to be to provide
assistance to the person or persons closest to a deceased insured imme-
diately following his [or her] death",40 benefits would not be payable to a
gay man or lesbian who lost his or her "head of the household" in an
automobile accident.
4. Income Tax
Although the federal Income Tax Act is based on the principle of individ-
ual taxation, it privileges married heterosexual couples in several ways.
For one, the married status tax credit is available only to married heterosex-
ual couples.41 It can be claimed by one spouse (most commonly the hus-
band) only when the other has earned little or no income. Cohabiting
heterosexuals and same-sex couples cannot claim a tax credit for their
dependent partners, although they can claim the single person tax credit.42
As the marital status tax credit is significantly larger than the single person
tax credit, the Act gives a substantial financial advantage, of all one-income
couples, to those who are married. The tax credit scheme is relatively
neutral in the case of two-income couples since both partners, married or
not, can claim a single person tax credit.
The Act provides further advantages to married heterosexuals by allow-
ing them to contribute to each other's registered retirement savings plans
and by providing tax-free rollovers on the transfer of property from one
spouse to another.43 For some wealthy taxpayers, however, a lack of mari-
tal status may be advantageous in enabling the avoidance of income tax
attribution rules upon the transfer of income or property to the taxpayer's
spouse. But the net effect of the rules described above is to make same-sex
and unmarried heterosexual couples worse off relative to their married
counterparts. This economic penalty places a particularly onerous burden
39 Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.218, Schedule C.
40 Demers v. Cornwall, (1981) 125 D.L.R. (3d) 537 at 539 (Ont. H. Ct.).
41 Income Tax Act, section 118(1), added by S.C. 1988, c.55, s.92. Cohabiting hetero-
sexuals are not entitled to the married status credit. Toutant v. M.N.R., supra note
22; Interpretation Bulletin 1T-513, February 3,1989. In 1989, the maximum mar-
ried status tax credit amounted to $1,890.57.
42 Ibid., s.118(1)(c). The single person tax credit in 1989 was $1,031.22.
43 See Maloney, "Women and the Income Tax Act- Marriage, Motherhood and
Divorce" (1989) 3 Can. J. Women and Law 182 at 185-6.
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on lesbian couples who face additional economic disadvantage as
women.44
B. Legislation Conferring Rights and Obligations
1. Right to Marry or to Have One's Relationship Recognized by the State
In Canada, the capacity to marry is not defined clearly in legislation. As a
constitutional matter, jurisdiction to legislate regarding who can and can-
not marry rests with the federal government, while jurisdiction over cere-
monial requirements rests with the provinces.45 The Parliament of Canada
has not exercised its jurisdiction to set out explicit criteria regarding the
capacity to marry,46 and any attempt by the provinces to do so would be
unconstitutional and of no force and effect. As a result, neither federal nor
provincial legislation explicitly bars same-sex couples from marrying.47
44 In 1988, the average salary of women working full time was $21,918, while for
men it was $33,558. Earnings of Men and Women 1988 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
1989). See also Employment Equity Report (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Ser-
vices, 1989); Women and Labour Market Poverty (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, 1990); Women in Canada: A Statistical Report
(Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985); R.S. Abella, Report of the Royal
Commission on Equality in Employment (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada,
1984).
45 Section 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives the federal government exclu-
sive jurisdiction in relation to "marriage and divorce". By virtue of s.92(12), the
provinces have exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the "solemnization of mar-
riage in the province". According to judicial interpretation of these powers, the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the legal capacity to
marry ("essential validity") while the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction to
impose ceremonial or evidentiary requirements as conditions precedent to a
marriage ("formal validity"). Re Marriage Legislation in Canada, [1912] A.C. 880;
Kerr v. Kerr, [1934] S.C.R. 72; A.G. Alta. v. Underwood, [1934] S.C.R. 635; P. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 535-6; H.A. Hahlo,
Nullity of Marriage in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1979) 5-6; Katz, "The Scope
of the Federal Legislative Authority in Relation to Marriage" (1975) 7 Ottawa L.
Rev. 384.
46 The federal government has legislated regarding capacity to marry to alter the
degrees of consanguinity prohibited by the common law. Marriage Act, R.S.C.
1985, c.M-2.
47 For example, s.5(1) of the Ontario Marriage Act provides as follows:
Any person who is of the age of majority may obtain a license or be married
under the authority of the publication of banns, provided no lawful cause
exists to hinder the solemnization.
R.S.O. 1980, c.256. The relevant legislation in the other provinces is: Solemnization
of Marriage Act, S.N. 1974, No.81; Solemnization of Marriage Act, R.S.N.S. 1989,
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However, according to the common law, "marriage being, by definition,
the union of a man and a woman, a marriage between two persons of the
same sex is null and void." 48
In only one reported Canadian decision has a same-sex couple sought to
have their marriage legally recognized. 49 In North v. Matheson5O, a gay
couple sought to compel the Manitoba authorities to register their mar-
riage. The Manitoba Marriage Act s ' provided simply that an authorized
person "may solemnize the ceremony of marriage between any two per-
sons not under a legal disqualification to contract the marriage."52 Philp
Co. Ct. J. noted that neither federal nor provincial legislation defined the
capacity to marry; neither level of government had explicitly prohibited
same-sex marriage. He pointed out that a province lacked the constitu-
tional power to pass a law permitting same-sex marriage since the federal
government has the exclusive constitutional authority to legislate regard-
ing capacity to marry5 3
In the absence of legislative direction, the judge decided that capacity to
marry had to be gleaned from the common law, dictionaries and the Ency-
clopedia Britannica. After consulting these sources, Philp J.A. concluded
that it is "universally accepted by society"54 that marriage is the union of
c.436; Marriage Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c.M-3; Marriage Act, RS.PE.I. 1974, c.M-5;
Quebec Civil Code, Title V, c.II, Article 142; Marriage Act, RS.M. 1987, c.M50;
Marriage Act, R-S.S. 1978, c.M-4; Marriage Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.M-6; Marriage Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c.251.
4 H.A. Hahlo, supra note 45 at 10.
49 In the United States, the courts have rejected arguments that state marriage
statutes should be interpreted as including same-sex couples. See Singer v. Hara,
11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) ; Jones v. Hallalmn, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
50 (1974) 20 RF.L. 112 (Man. Co. Ct.).
51 RS.M. 1987, c.M50.
52 Ibid., s2.
5 The judge stated (supra note 50 at 114) that if a provincial legislature had passed a
law enabling same-sex couples to marry
... Iwould have no hesitation in finding that such a provision is clearly ultra vires
as being part of the substantive law of marriage and divorce, a matter exclusively
within the competence of the Parliament of Canada under s.91(26) of the B.N.A.
Act, 1867. 1 would view such a provision as affecting the essential capacity of a
person to marry, and not as a condition as to the solemnization which is within
the legislative competence of the provincial legislatures under s.92(12)...
5 Ibid. at 114. Presumably, the gay couple before the court was not part of "society."
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two persons of the opposite sex. Thus, the applicants' ceremony of mar-
riage was, in the eyes of the law, a nullity.55
Not only has access to marriage been denied to gay and lesbian couples,
Canadian law provides no alternative legal status for same-sex relation-
ships. Federal and provincial legislation has increasingly taken account of
the existence of the "common law" relationships of heterosexual cohabi-
tants who choose not to many.5 6 But common law recognition of unmar-
ried cohabitation does not extend to same-sex couples; nor have statutory
definitions of cohabiting unmarried spouses been extended to include gays
or lesbians.5 7 While heterosexual couples may choose the legal status that
best suits their needs, gay and lesbian couples have no choice: they have no
legal status.
2. Right to a Mechanism for Resolving Property Disputes on the
Breakdown of a Relationship
Provincial legislation provides a right to resolve property disputes on
breakdown of a relationship. However, this legislation does not apply to
same-sex nor (in most instances) to unmarried heterosexual couples. In
Ontario, for example, the Family Law Act applies only to married heterosex-
uals for the purposes of dividing family property and the disposition of the
family home.5 8 Similarly, in a B.C. case, Anderson v. Luoma,5 9 Dohm J.
rejected a woman's claims, based on the B.C. Family Relations Act 60 and the
55 The North decision was based on statutory interpretation, and it was decided in
1974, eight years before the coming into force of the Charter. The judge relied on
traditional understandings to give meaning to the open-ended language of the
legislation. When a similar case comes before the Canadian courts in the future,
North can be distinguished on the grounds that judges are now under an obliga-
tion to interpret legislation and develop the common law in a manner consistent
with the equality rights in the Charter, to be discussed in Part III below.
56 For overviews of the legal status of cohabiting unmarried heterosexuals, see
Equality for All, supra note 9 at 35-7; Bala and Cano, "Unmarried Cohabitation in
Canada: Common Law and Civilian Approaches to Living Together" (1989) 4
Can. Fain. L.Q. 147; Boivin, "To Marry or Not to Marry? A Study of the Legal
Situation of Common Law Spouses in Canadian Law" in E. Sloss ed., Family Law
in Canada: New Directions (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of
Women, 1985) 169; McLellan, "Marital Status and Equality Rights" in A.
Bayefsky and M. Eberts eds., Equality Rights and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell,
1985) 411; W. Holland, Unmarried Couples: Legal Aspects of Cohabitation (Toronto:
Carswell, 1982).
57 See Anderson v. Luoma, (1986) 50 R.F.L. (2d) 127 (B.C.S.C.).
'58 S.O. 1986, c.4, s.1(1).
59 Supra note 57.
60 Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.121, s.1.
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common law, to maintenance and a share of the matrimonial property on
the breakdown of her lesbian relationship. To the argument that the plain-
tiff's exclusion from the scheme of the Act violated her equality rights in
s.15 of the Charter, Dohm J. gave an unexplained, one-line response: "[tihe
answer is found in s.1 of the Charter."61 However, relying on the equitable
doctrine of constructive trust which entitles a partner to claim a share of
property where she has contributed to its acquisition, preservation, main-
tenance or improvement, 62 Dohm J. was able to award the plaintiff an
interest in property to reflect her economic contribution to the relation-
ship.63
Married heterosexuals have resort to both statutory and equitable re-
medies in resolving property disputes on the breakdown of the relation-
ship. On those occasions where equitable remedies may be more advan-
tageous to a claimant than statutory remedies, the Supreme Court has held
that it would be
... inequitable.., if married persons were precluded by the Family Law Act,
1986 from utilizing the doctrine of remedial constructive trust which is avail-
able to unmarried persons.64
Arguably, it is similarly inequitable to deny unmarried persons access to
the matrimonial property legislative provisions which are available to mar-
ried persons. However, the existence of remedial disparaties based on
marital status is not per se inequitable if there is value in providing a
plurality of legal regimes and allowing couples to choose the legal status
that best suits their needs. Some cohabiting heterosexuals may make a
conscious choice not to "opt in" to the legal framework of marriage. The
exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from matrimonial property legislation
is inequitable, however, for they are not only excluded along with unmar-
ried cohabiting heterosexuals, they are also denied the choice to "opt in" by
marrying.
3. Right to Support on Breakdown of a Relationship
Similarly, the right of an economically dependent partner to seek sup-
port from the other partner on the breakdown of a relationship is not made
available to lesbians or gays by family law legislation, although in most
61 Supra note 57 at 142.
62 Rathwell v. Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 204; Pettkus v. Becker, [19801 2 S.C.L 834.;
Sorochan v. Sorochan, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 220; Rawluk v. Rawluk, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70.
63 Supra note 57 at 149-153.
64 Rawluk v. Rawluk, supra note 62 at 96.
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jurisdictions both married persons and opposite-sex cohabitants are enti-
tled to support from their partners. 65 In Anderson v. Luoma, Wallace J.
rejected a lesbian's claim for interim maintenance from her partner, reason-
ing as follows:
The Family Relations Act does not purport to affect the legal responsibilities
which homosexuals may have to each other or to children born to one of them
as a result of artificial insemination. The Act's application is, in general,
directed to the spousal and parental relations of men and women in their role
of husband, wife and parent.66
The legislative failure to recognize the existence of gay and lesbian rela-
tionships serves to exacerbate the economic vulnerability, particularly of
lesbians, that is created by discrimination in the provision of family bene-
fits. Although lesbians and gays may choose to live economically interde-
pendent lives, they do so at greater risk than heterosexuals. A dependent
partner has no right to claim support, and in the absence of a legislative
mechanism for a fair resolution of economic affairs on the breakdown of a
same-sex relationship, trust doctrines provide the only means of equitably
allocating rights to property.
4. Right to Enter Cohabitation Agreements
One way of minimizing the risk of being unfairly treated on breakdown
of a relationship is to enter into cohabitation contracts or separation agree-
ments to deal with such matters as property rights, support obligations and
custody of children. Traditionally, the common law sought to promote
marriage by holding invalid, as contrary to public policy, contracts that
contemplated cohabitation without marriage.67 The common law rule has
been altered by statute in most jurisdictions to allow cohabiting unmarried
heterosexuals to enter into cohabitation and separation agreements. 68 Leg-
islation is silent on the contractual rights of same-sex couples. Thus, the
validity of contracts between gay and lesbian couples will continue to be
determined by the common law. In the absence of legislative reform, judges
have cited increased social acceptance of cohabitation and sexual relations
between unmarried heterosexuals in abandoning the old common law
65 Family Law Act, S.O. 1986, c.4, s.29; Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.121,
s.1(c). For an overview of legislation in other jurisdictions, see Bala and Cano,
supra note 56.
66 (1984) 42 R.F.L. (2d) 444 at 446 (B.C.S.C.). This reasoning was later affirmed and
adopted by Dohm J. in the trial decision: supra note 57.
67 Fender v. St. John Mildmay, [1938] A.C. 1 (H.L.); Prokop v. Kohut, [1965] 54 D.L.R.
(2d) 717 (B.C.S.C.).
68 E.g., Family Law Act, 1986, R.S.O. 1986, c.4. ss.2(10), 53 and 54.
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position and upholding contracts between cohabiting heterosexuals.69 The
one Canadian case dealing with the issue suggests that cohabitation con-
tracts between gays and lesbians are enforceable at common law.70
5. Right to Custody of and Access to Children
On the breakdown of a relationship, custody of children is determined
according to "the best interests of the child" test.71 The judiciary exercises a
great deal of discretion in the application and interpretation of this general
legislative standard in particular cases.72 The courts have frequently stated
that a parent's homosexuality is not per sea bar to custody. There are as yet
no reported cases dealing with custody disputes between same-sex par-
ents. However, the case law dealing with the breakdown of an opposite-sex
relationship indicates that a parent involved openly in a same-sex relation-
ship has an increased risk of losing custody or being granted restricted
access to her or his children. Many of the court decisions ask gay and
lesbian parents to choose between their children and open relationships
with their lovers.
For lesbian mothers in custody disputes, a relationship with a woman is
a liability unless the court is satisfied that she will be discreet, not "flaunt"
her sexuality, or publicly associate herself with lesbian organizations. 3 A
69 Chrispen v. Topham, (1986) 3 R.FL. (3d) 149 at 154 (Sask. Q.B.), aff'd (1987) 9 LEL
(3d) 131 (Sask C.A.); Wray v. Rubin, (1987) 62 O.R. (2d) 578, 14 RF.L. (3d) 201
(Ont. Div. Ct); Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,134 Cal. Rptr. 815,557 P.2d 106
(1976).
70 Anderson v. Luoma, supra note 57 (assuming that a contract regarding support
obligations would have been enforceable if it had existed). Two decisions from
the California courts suggest that cohabitation contracts between two men will
be more difficult to enforce because the judiciary will be more likely to view gay
relationships solely in sexual terms: Jones v. Daly, 122 Cal. App. 3d 500,176 Cal.
Rptr. 130 (1981) (refusing to enforce a cohabitation contract because it was based
on "meretricious consideration"); Whorton v. Dillinghai, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct.
App. 1988) (enforcing a contract between two gay men).
71 See, e.g., Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.68, s.24(1).
72 See, e.g., Re Moores and Feldstein, (1973) 12 R.FL. 280 (Ont. C.A.); More v. Prinzeau,
(1977) 2 REL. (2d) 254 (Ont. C.A.).
73 See Case v. Case, (1974) 18 R.EL. 132 (Sask. Q.B.); K. v. K., (1975) 23 R.F.L. 58 (Alta.
Prov. C.); Barkley v. Barkley, (1980) 28 O.R. (2d) 136 (Prov. Ct); Bernhardt v.
Bernhardt, (1979) 10 RF.EL. (2d) 32 (Man. Q.B.); Bezaire v. Bezaire, (1980) 20 RF.L
(2d) 358 (Ont. C.A.); Elliott v. Elliott, (1984) 25 A.C.W.S. (2d) 304. InJ. v. R., (1982)
27 R.F.L. (3d) 380 (Que. S.C.), the court struck down a clause in a separation
agreement that required a mother's access to her children to be exercised only in
the absence of her lesbian lover. The court found that the clause constituted
discrimination prohibited by the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For
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similar pattern emerges in cases involving gay fathers. These cases most
frequently arise in the context of an attempt to vary the father's access
rights in response to his entering a relationship. Openly gay fathers who
live with their lovers risk a restriction or denial of overnight access, partic-
ularly if they are "activists" or not "discreet about their homosexual life-
style."74 For example, in Saunders v. Saunders,75 a gay man was denied
overnight access, notwithstanding the conclusion of a court-ordered access
report that the men "would be as discreet as heterosexual couples when
children are in the home." Wetmore J. concluded that:
This child has a normal stable home in which there are only the normal
environmental circumstances for maturity to develop. Surely it cannot be
argued that exposure of a child to unnatural relationships is in the best
interests of that child of tender years... the prudent parent does not volun-
tarily and deliberately expose a child to any environmental influence which
might affect normal development. 76
The judge distinguished cases with results more favourable to lesbian and
gay parents on the grounds that the parents in those cases had "exercised
great restraint in minimizing the sexual choice of that parent as a role
model for the child." Here, the father had demonstrated "no intention in
minimizing his attachment" to his lover.77
thorough discussions of these cases, see Arnup, "'Mothers Just Like Others':
Lesbians, Divorce and Child Custody in Canada" (1989) 3 Can. J. Women and
Law 18; Gross, "Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Child Custody and the
Homosexual Parent" (1986) 1 Can. J. Women and Law 505; Leopold and King,
"Compulsory Heterosexuality, Lesbians and the Law: The Case for Constitu-
tional Protection" (1985) 1 Can. J. Women and Law 163 at 170-6; Brownstone,
"The Homosexual Parent in Custody Disputes" (1980) 5 Queen's L.J. 199; Boyle,
"Custody, Adoption and the Homosexual Parent" (1976) 23 R.F.L. 129.
74 D. v. D., (1978) 20 O.R. (2d) 722 (Co. Ct.) (bisexual father awarded custody
because he was not a "militant" active in gay organizations and he kept his
sexual identity hidden from all but a few close friends); Worby v. Worby, (1985) 48
R.F.L. (2d) 369 (Sask. Q.B.) (gay parent cohabiting with his lover denied over-
night access "while his present lifestyle continues"); E.(A) v. E.(G.), Unreported
decision of the Newfoundland Supreme Court, Halley J., September 22, 1989
(refusing to terminate access to "discreet", apolitical gay parent cohabiting with
his lover, but delaying overnight access to gay father cohabiting with his lover to
give grandparents a chance to "get used to the idea"); P.B. v. P.B., April 6, 1988,
Unreported decision of the Ontario Provincial Court (Family Division) (delaying
overnight access to gay parent cohabiting with his lover; two men ordered to
sleep in separate rooms when overnight access commences).
75 (1989) 20 R.F.L. (3d) 368 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
76 Ibid. at 370-1.
77 Ibid. at 371.
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The implicit or explicit devaluing of gay or lesbian relationships present
in these cases contrasts starkly with a reverse presumption operating in
custody disputes if a parent has a lover of the opposite sex. A new hetero-
sexual relationship, flaunted or not, is seen as an indication of a return to
stability and a loving, nurturing environment, unless it can be demon-
strated by positive evidence that the relationship is harmful to the chil-
dren.78 Evidently, the best interests of the child test is applied in custody
disputes with reference to a normative standard, namely that a privileged
family unit provides the ideal environment for the raising of children. As a
result, the emotional trauma and economic vulnerability that often follows
a separation will be compounded for gay and, especially, lesbian parents.
6. Wills
A gay man or lesbian has no recourse if his or her partner dies intestate or
without leaving adequate financial provision. In Ontario, when a person
dies intestate, the spouse and children of the deceased are entitled to the
entire estate.79 Spouse is defined as the heterosexual marriage partner of
the deceased.80 If there is no spouse so defined, and no descendants, the
estate will be distributed to parents, siblings, and others related by consan-
guinity.81 The onus is placed on gays, lesbians and cohabiting heterosex-
uals to execute wills in order to protect their partners' financial well-being.
Similarly, heterosexual spouses, parents, children and siblings of a de-
78 Hill v. Hill, (1975) 19 R.F.L. 119 (Ont. C.A.) (mother living with her male lover
granted custody in the absence of evidence "of any acts of immorality in the
presence of children, by word or deed" (at 122)). Fullerton v. Fullerton, (1983) 37
L.EL. (2d) 168 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.) (refusing application to vary father's access on
grounds that he was cohabiting with his female lover; "if such unions were a bar
to custody or overnight access a great many children would not be able to live or
visit with their parents" (at 169)); Mattison v. Mattison, (1984) 42 R.F.L. (2d) 215
(Sask. Q.B.) (refusing application to deny overnight access to father living with
his female lover in the absence of evidence that the relationship was harmful to
the children). In cases where fathers are granted custody, the courts are fre-
quently impressed by the stabilizing, loving, co-parenting role played by the
father's female lover Law v. Maxwell, (1984) 40 R.F.L. (2d) 189 (B.C.C.A.); Fishback
v. Fishback, (1985) 46 R.FL. (2d) 44 (Ont. Dist. Ct.); Bosch v. Bosch, (1985) 49 IRF.L
(2d) 157 (Sask. Q.B.).
79 Succession Law Refonn Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.488, ss.44-7.
80 Ibid. s.1(fa), added by S.O.1986, c.53, s.1(2). Prior to the amendment, spouse was
interpreted to mean the person to whom the deceased was legally married: Re
McFarland, (1987) 60 O.R. (2d) 73 (H.Ct.); Re Ingrain and Fenton, (1987) 5 A.C.WS.
(3d) 108 (Ont. H.Ct).
81 Ibid. s.47.
1990]
REVUE CANADIENNE DE DROIT FAMILIAL
ceased may apply for dependants' relief if they have not been adequately
provided for in the deceased's will.82 Dependent same-sex partners are
denied this right.
7. Tort Rights
Family members have the fight to bring a dependants' claim for dam-
ages against a person who has negligently caused the death or injury of
another family member. For example, in Ontario, s.61 of the Family Law Act,
1986 allows married persons, cohabiting heterosexuals, parents, grand-
parents, children, grandchildren and siblings to bring an action for their
pecuniary loss and the loss of guidance, care and companionship. 83 The
heterosexually-exclusive definition of "spouse" does not allow for claims
by gays or lesbians for losses flowing from the negligently caused death or
injury of their partners.
Similarly, a person who suffers emotional shock upon witnessing or
hearing of the death or injury of a closely related person caused by the
negligence of another can bring an action for damages suffered as a result
of the negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, the defendant
must have been able to foresee that a person in the plaintiff's position
would suffer injury, and generally the courts have denied recovery to
plaintiffs unless they are rescuers or closely related to the victim by blood,
marriage or adoption. I know of no Canadian cases where a claim has been
brought by the gay or lesbian lover of a victim. The California courts,
relying on the state's interest in promoting marriage, have recently denied
recovery to both a gay man84 and an unmarried heterosexual8 5 who suf-
fered emotional distress upon witnessing the negligently caused injury of
their respective lovers.
8. Right to Employment in the Canadian Armed Forces
The Canadian Armed Forces has a long-standing policy of refusing to
enlist gays and lesbians. In addition, pursuant to Canadian Forces Admin-
istrative Order 19-20, members of the Armed Forces have a duty to report
any suspicions that another member is a "homosexual" or has a "sexual
abnormality". CFAO 19-20 further provides that "service policy does not
82 Ibid. s.57(6), as am. by S.O. 1986, c.53, s.2. In B.C., see the Estate Administration Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c.14, ss.85, 86, which now allows claims by the unmarried hetero-
sexual spouse of the deceased.
83 S.O. 1986, c.4, ss.29, 61.
84 Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1987).
85 Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal.3d 267, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582 (1988).
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allow homosexual members or members with a sexual abnormality to be
retained in the Canadian Forces." 86 In other words, the Forces' policy has
been to seek out and dismiss gays and lesbians. Members have been dis-
charged after investigations and interrogations that have been described as
"literally hours of voyeuristic harassment for us to reveal the intimate
details of our sex life."87
In 1985, the Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights
condemned the Armed Forces' policy of exclusion and the prejudices and
stereotypes on which it is founded.88 In 1986, the federal government
responded by promising to remove employment discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in all areas of federal jurisdiction.99 Four years
later, the policy is still "under review".90
9. Immigration: Right to Sponsor a Family Member
The Immigration Act was amended in 1952 to add "prostitutes, homosex-
uals or persons living on the avails of prostitution or homosexualism" to
the classes of persons prohibited from entering Canada.91 As a result, gays
and lesbians were barred from entering Canada as visitors or prospective
permanent residents, and were subject to deportation. More than a dozen
gay and lesbian organizations appeared at parliamentary hearings held in
1975, and were successful in having the references to homosexuals re-
moved from the Immigration Act, 1976.92 As Philip Girard has noted, the
immigration exclusion represents the sole occasion on which Canadian
legislation has referred to "the homosexual" as a status or type of person.93
86 For a full discussion see Bruner, "Sexual Orientation and Equality Rights", in A.
Bayefsky and M. Eberts eds., Equality Rights and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell,
1985) 457 at 478-91; Jefferson, "Gay Rights and the Charter" (1985) 43:1 U.T. Fac.
L. Rev. 70 at 86-8.
87 Testimony of Ms. Darl Wood, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of tie Standing
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs (Sub-Connittee on Equality Rights) (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1985) 14:38.
88 Equality for All, supra note 9 at 31.
89 Canada, Department of Justice, Toward Equality: The Response to the Report of the
Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights (Ottawa: 1986) 13.
90 Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 8, 1990 at 9005.
91 Immigration Act, 1952, R.S.C. 1952, c.325, ss.5(e), 5(f) and s.19.
92 S.C. 1976-77, c.52. See Girard, "From Subversion to Liberation: Homosexuals and
the Immigration Act, 1952-1977" (1987) 2 C.J. Law and Society 1; Green, "Give
Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses (Of Heterosexuals): An Anal-
ysis of American and Canadian Immigration Policy" (1987) 16 Anglo-American
L. Rev. 139.
93 Girard, supra, note 92 at 6.
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Discrimination against gays and lesbians continues under the family
reunification provisions of the current Immigration Act. A principal policy
goal of the Act is to "facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens
and permanent residents with their close relatives from abroad." 94 To this
end, Canadian citizens or permanent residents can sponsor members of
their families for immigration purposes. The regulations define the family
class as those individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption to the
sponsoree. Children, parents, married spouses and even fiance(e)s are in-
cluded. 95 Unmarried heterosexual, gay or lesbian partners cannot be spon-
sored.96
C. Legislation Conferring Benefits on the Basis of Family Income
Some legislation prescribes eligibility for public benefits on the basis of
income earned by a family unit. In this type of situation, same-sex cohabi-
tants have an ironic advantage over opposite-sex cohabitants, because
being deemed a "spouse" may disentitle a person from benefits if her or his
income lifts the family over the income ceiling for entitlement.
An example of this type of legislation are welfare laws that disentitle
persons in need from benefits if they are cohabiting with a person of the
opposite sex.97 These rules are premised on the male breadwinner model of
94 Immigration Act, R.S.C.1985, c.I-2, s.3(c).
95 Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172,1978 Canada Gazette Part II at 757, as
am. by SOR/85-225,1985 Canada Gazette Part II at 1517 (s.2(1) defines spouse as
"the party of the opposite sex to whom that person is joined in marriage"; s.4(1)
defines members of the family class). See McIntosh, "Defining 'Family' -- A
Comment on the Family Reunification Provisions in the Immigration Act" (1988)
3 J. L. and Social Policy 104.
96 See Vulpen v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Immigration Appeal Board,
V79-6100, August 29,1980, holding that a transsexual sponsoree was of the same
sex as her husband and therefore not a spouse within the meaning of the regula-
tions. The Federal Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the sponsoree did fall
within the definition of spouse (A-179-81, 1982). See Green, supra, note 92 at
152-3. Nor has United States law recognized same-sex relationships for immigra-
tion purposes: Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (1982), cert. denied 458 U.S. 1111
(1982) (denying an alien gay partner's petition for classification as an immediate
family member of an American citizen).
97 E.g., General Welfare Assistance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.188, Reg. 441; Family Benefits
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.151, Reg. 318. See Mossman and MacLean, "Family Law and
Social Welfare: Toward a New Equality" (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 79; Leighton,
"Handmaids' Tales: Family Benefits Assistance and the Single-Mother-Led Fam-
ily" (1987) 45 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 324.
Another example is eligibility for student loans. For the purposes of Ontario
student loans, the Minister is to determine the financial resources of the student,
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relationships: a man in the house is presumed, solely by virtue of his
"spousal" status, to be providing economic support to his opposite sex
cohabitant. The ironic exclusion of lesbians and gays from these rules is a
result of seeing relationships through this traditional heterosexual lens.
D. Conflict of Interest Legislation
Lesbians and gays are excluded from the state's definition of emotionally
involved relationships for the purposes of conflict of interest laws. This
type of legislation usually prohibits persons in situations of potential con-
flict of interest from holding certain financial interests and then deems a
financial interest of a spouse to be a financial interest of the other spouse.93
Thus, whether the law is imposing economic restrictions, conferring bene-
fits or allocating rights and obligations, the state has consistently refused to
acknowledge that people may be involved in emotionally and economi-
cally interdependent relationships with persons of the same sex.
E. Criminal Law
In only one area has the law dealt especially with gay men: in regulating
their sexuality under the Criminal Code.99 Until 1969, anyone who engaged
in anal intercourse ("buggery")10 0 or "gross indecency" 10o committed a
criminal offence. Gross indecency has never been adequately defined; the
best definition the courts have been able to provide is that it is a "marked
departure from decent conduct expected of the average Canadian". 02
Prior to its repeal in 1987, it included virtually any gay sexual conduct.10 3 In
having regard to the income and assets of the student's heterosexual spouse.
Reg.644 under the Ministry of Colleges ad Universities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.272.
98 E.g. Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, 1983, S.O. 1983, c.8, s.l(n) as am. by S.O.
1986, c.64, s.38; Ontario Energy Board Act, R-S.O. 1980, c.332, as am. by S.O. 1986,
c.64, s.45.
99 See Demers, "De la Lex Scantinia aux Rdents Amendements du Code Criminel:
Homosexualit( et Droit dans une Perspective Historique" (1984) 25 Les Cahiers
de Droit 777; A. Gigeroff, Sexual Deviations in the Crihral Latw: Homosexual,
Exhibitionistic and Pedophilic Offences in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1968).
100 S.C. 1954, c.51, s.149.
101 Ibid., s.147.
102 R. v. Quesnel and Quesnel, (1979) 51 C.C.C. (2d) 270,280 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lebeau,
(1988) 41 C.C.C. (3d) 163 (Ont. C.A.).
103 As recently as 1967, a gay man was sentenced to an indefinite prison term for
four unspecified acts of gross indecency with other consenting men: Kiippert :
The Queen, [19671 S.C.R. 822. See G. Kinsman, supra note 18 at 161-4. The rela-
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addition, many gay men have been charged over the years as "found-ins"
or "keepers" of a "common bawdy-house", defined vaguely as any place
resorted to for the practice of acts of indecency.1°4
In 1969, the Criminal Code was amended to decriminalize anal inter-
course and acts of gross indecency when engaged in, in private, between
husband and wife, or between any two persons over the age of twenty one,
both of whom consent to the act.105 Although anyone can engage in anal
intercourse and gross indecency, the practical effect of the amendment was
to partially decriminalize gay sexuality. Nevertheless, the boundaries on
legal sex set by the age of consent'0 6 and the public/private distinction
10 7
continued to be more narrowly drawn in practice for gay men than for
heterosexuals.
In 1987, the offence of gross indecency was repealed and the age of
consent to anal intercourse was reduced to eighteen.10s The criminal stigma
attached to gay sexuality remains, as the age of consent to other sexual acts
is fourteen. The federal government did not follow the recommendation of
the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights that the age of consent to
private sexual activity be made uniform without distinction based on sex-
ual orientation.1° 9
tionship of "gross indecency" to lesbian sexuality was never decided clearly by
the courts: see R. v. C., (1981) 30 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 451 (Nfld. C.A.). For a discussion
of the ways in which the criminal law impacts on lesbian existence, see Eaton,
"Lesbians and the Law", in S. Stone ed., Lesbians in Canada 109 at 111-4 (Toronto:
Between the Lines, 1990).
104 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, s.197(1) and s.210. For analyses of the impact
of this provision on institutions of the gay community, see Russell, 'The Offence
of Keeping a Common Bawdy House in Canadian Criminal Law" (1982) 14
Ottawa L. Rev. 270; Fleming, "The Bawdy House 'Boys': Some Notes on Media,
Sporadic Moral Crusades and Selective Law Enforcement" (1981) 3 Cdn. Crim.
Forum 101.
105 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, S.C. 1968-69, c.38, s.7.
106 The 1969 amendment set the age of consent to gay sex at 21, while for most
heterosexual acts it was 14.
107 In practice, the public/private distinction, which determined the legality of
gross indecency and anal intercourse under the 1969 amendment, has a differ-
ent meaning for gays who are far more likely to be charged for having sex in
quasi-public places than heterosexuals are, for example, while parked in
"lover's lanes".
108 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, s.159(2).
109 Arguments that s.159 in its current form violates Charter equality rights have
led to inconsistent results: R. v. H.(D.), (1989) 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 414 (Alta. Prov.
Ct.) ("justifiable protection of unmarried children"); R. v. Robinson, (1988) 4
W.C.B. (2d) 178 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) (rejecting arguments that the section discrimi-
nates on the basis of marital status); R. v. L.(L.A.), (1986)16 W.C.B. 483 (Ont. Prov.
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F. Summary
The above survey illustrates that the law has deprived lesbians and gays
of material and psychic social resources and contributes dramatically to the
invisibility of gay and lesbian existence. Gays and lesbians, apparently, are
not fit to be named in Canadian legislation. The few legal glimpses of
lesbians and gays one finds are exclusionary and stigmatizing, such as the
exclusion of "homosexuals" in the 1952 Immigration Act and from the
Armed Forces, and the criminalization of gay sexuality. One searches in
vain for a positive image of gays or lesbians in Canadian legal culture.
II
Since the emergence of the gay liberation movement in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, gays and lesbians have organized to demand equal rights to
those currently granted to heterosexuals.11 0 As the prevalence of legal
discrimination outlined in Part I illustrates, these efforts have been largely
ignored. There has been some success in obtaining amendments to the
Criminal Code and the Immigration Act, in having sexual orientation in-
cluded as a prohibited ground of discrimination in human rights legisla-
tion in Quebec,"' Ontario, 112 Manitoba,113 and the Yukon,' 1 4 and in having
sexual orientation recognized as a ground of discrimination that is prohib-
ited by the open-ended language of s.15 of the Charter of Rights.115
As a result, gays and lesbians find themselves in the paradoxical situa-
tion where their right to equality is guaranteed by legislation and, it ap-
pears, by the Constitution, yet they are subject to a wide array of laws that
Ct.) (section discriminates on the basis of age and is of no force and effect); R. %,
Schnare, Unreported decision of the Nova Scotia Provincial Court, February 15,
1990 (rejecting arguments that s.159 discriminates against gays).
110 See, e.g., the demands of the August 28th, 1971 Gay Day Committee, reprinted
in E. Jackson and S. Persky eds., Flaunting It! A Decade of Gay Journalism from the
Body Politic (Vancouver. New Star Books, 1982) 216-220.
111 Charter of Human Rights and Freedonms, R.S.Q. 1977, c.C-12, s.10.
112 Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c.53, as am. by S.O. 1984, c.58, s.39 and S.O.
1986, c.64, s.18.
113 Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987-88, c.45, s.9(2)(h).
114 Human Rights Act, S.Y. 1987, c.3, s.6(g).
115 Equality for All, supra note 9 at 21; Towards Equality, supra note 89 at 13; Veyey v.
Canada (Commissioner of Correctional Services), (1990) 29 F.T.R 74, aff'd on other
grounds by the Federal Court of Appeal, unreported decision dated May 31,
1990 (Court File A-557-89); Brown v. British Columbia Minister of Hcalth, (1990) 42
B.C.L.R. (2d) 294 at 309-10 (B.C.S.C.).
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discriminate explicitly on the grounds of sexual orientation.' 16 Two recent
examples of legal documents in which institutionalized inequality sits
side-by-side with a commitment to equality illustrate the legal contradic-
tions in this area.
In the 1985 Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights,
Equality for All 1 7 the authors argued that discrimination on the basis of
marital status is prohibited by the open-ended language of s.15 of the
Charter.1 18 Therefore, "a law that treats those in a common law relationship
less favourably than those who are legally married is arguably in violation
of the Charter."'119 The committee urged that the definition of "spouse" in
federal laws be amended to include cohabiting heterosexual partners, not
just married persons.120
The Report also concluded that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is prohibited by s.15.121 The committee went on to recommend
that the policy of excluding gays and lesbians from the military be re-
pealed, and that sexual orientation be added as a prohibited ground of
discrimination in the Canadian Human Rights Act.122 However, the commit-
tee did not mention the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition
of spouse in all federal legislation.
A similar contradiction lies at the heart of the Ontario Equality Rights
Statute Law Amendment Act, 1986 (Bill 7), 23 passed in 1987 to bring some
Ontario statutes into conformity with the Charter. Among other things, Bill
7 removed some instances of marital status discrimination by changing the
definition of spouse in more than thirty statutes to include cohabiting
heterosexuals partners. Section 18 of the Bill added sexual orientation as a
prohibited ground of discrimination to the Ontario Human Rights Code.
However, the Bill made no attempt to alter the fact that same sex couples
are excluded from the definition of spouse in all Ontario legislation.
The omission of same-sex couples from the Equality for All Report and
116 Of course, other disadvantaged groups live in conditions of social and legal
inequality together with a promise of legal equality, but the form of discrimina-
tion tends to be more subtle, although no less invidious in effect.
117 Supra note 9.
118 Ibid. at 34.
119 Ibid. at 35.
120 Ibid. at 37.
121 Ibid. at 29.
122 Ibid. at 30-2. The federal government promised to follow this recommendation
in 1986 (see Toward Equality, supra note 89, at 13). As of mid-1990, the govern-
ment has not introduced the promised amendment.
123 S.O. 1986, c.64.
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the terms of Bill 7 cannot be explained as a matter of logic. Nor can it be
explained as an oversight. Gays and lesbians have been demanding equal
benefits to heterosexuals for many years. Rather, the current state of the law
is a reflection of the compassion/condonation discursive framework
through which heterosexism is rationalized.
The role of the compassion/condonation dichotomy in rationalizing het-
erosexism can be seen more dearly through an examination of the few
occasions on which gay and lesbian rights have been the subject of serious
debate in Canadian legislatures. The records of those debates are breath-
takingly heterosexist documents.
The 1969 reform of the Criminal Code partially decriminalizing gross
indecency and anal intercourse gave rise to an extensive debate in Parlia-
ment. Both opponents and proponents of the amendment assumed that
homosexuality was a sickness. They differed on the appropriate mecha-
nisms of control and treatment, the successful reformers arguing that the
"perversion" of homosexuality "requires charity and treatment" by doc-
tors and psychologists, rather than coercive state intervention through the
imposition of criminal sanctions. 24
Since 1969, debates have taken place in the legislatures of Quebec, On-
tario, Manitoba and the Yukon regarding the addition of sexual orientation
as a prohibited ground of discrimination to the human rights legislation of
these jurisdictions.125 The debates in Quebec and the Yukon were calm,
with only a few voices being raised in opposition to the principle that
persons should not be deprived of access to housing, employment and
services solely on the basis of their sexual orientation.' 26 On the other hand,
the debates in Ontario and Manitoba revealed the negative attitudes to-
ward homosexuality of a minority of legislators, ranging from, at best,
ignorance and a lack of sensitivity to, at worst, a deep-seated homophobia.
Opponents of the addition of sexual orientation to the Ontario Human
Rights Code by Bill 7 argued that it amounted to giving "special rights" or
124 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1969 at 4717-8669. For a full account of
the debate, see G. Kinsman, supra note 18 at 166-172.
125 Since 1988, unsuccessful attempts have been made to amend the Nova Scotia
human rights legislation to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation. Recent debates indicate that government members who oppose the
amendment subscribe to the same myths articulated by opponents in Manitoba
and Ontario. See "Mt. Cashel Evidence a Barrier to Rights Extension, Minister
Says" [Toronto] Globe and Mail (7 June 1990) A10.
126 Quebec, Debats de l'Assenble Nationale 1977, 4882-4892; Yukon Hansird, Decem-
ber 9, 1986, 219-230, February 12, 1987, 712-9.
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"preferential treatment" to gays and lesbians.127 A hateful and ignorant
parallel was drawn between homosexuality and pedophilia, necrophilia
and bestiality.128 One member of the provincial parliament suggested the
amendment would lead to a decline in the birth rate.129 And most fre-
quently, opponents of reform argued that society has every right to pro-
mote and prefer heterosexuality. They opposed the amendment because, in
their view, it threatened the privilege, or, some argued, the very existence,
of the heterosexual family by legitimating, promoting and condoning "a
homosexual lifestyle". 130
Those who spoke in favour of the amendment denied that it amounted to
a condonation, promotion or approval of homosexuality, or a threat to the
heterosexual family.131 They appealed to members' sense of charity and
compassion, arguing that gays and lesbians had an equal right to housing,
employment and services. A minority of members spoke out against the
hate and ignorance motivating the opposition.132 Only one member of the
legislature, Bob Rae, was willing to directly challenge the opposition's
heterosexual-exclusive definition of the family:
Let me remind those people who say otherwise that gay people have families
too. It is an insult to those whose parents, whose brothers and sisters and
whose children are gay ... Surely it is an insult to say, "Our view of the family
is so exclusive that it does not possibly include you."'133
The 1987 debate in Manitoba followed a similar pattern. Bill 47 intro-
duced a new Human Rights Code,'34 that, among other things, protects
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The debate on this
127 Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1986 Debates, at 3624 (Cousens); 3642 (Haggerty);
3679 (Hennessy); 3683 (Villeneuve); 3684 (Partington); 3689 (Barlow); 3740
(Gregory); 3750 (Sheppard); 3793 (McCague); 3835 (Leluk).
128 Ibid. at 3835-7 (Leluk).
129 Ibid. at 3682 (Villeneuve).
130 Ibid. at 3625 (Cousens); 3634 (McKessock); 3636-8 (Bernier); 3643,3668-9 (John-
son); 3673, 3675 (Runciman); 3678-9 (Hennessy); 3681-2 (Davis); 3686 (Part-
ington); 3741-2 (Gregory); 3748 (Maran); 3750 (Sheppard); 3756 (Pope); 3794-5
(McCague); 3835-7 (Leluk); 3846 (Jackson).
131 Ibid. at 3622 (Scott); 3676 (Henderson); 3791 (Caplan); 3796 (Callahan); 3806-8
(Fish); 3838-9 (Wrye); 3854 (Grossman); 3856 (Peterson).
132 Ibid. at 3627-9 (Gigantes); 3691 (Nixon); 3805 (Mackenzie); 3852 (Rae); 3853
(Grossman).
133 Ibid. at 3852. Several other members challenged the heterosexual family rhetoric
of the opposition less directly, by speaking of the "human family" (ibid. at 3789
(Reville)), "that broader family we call Ontario society" (ibid. at 3807-8 (Fish)), or
the biblical family of "all human beings" (ibid. at 3743 (Smith)).
134 S.M. 1987-88, c.45.
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legislation focused almost exclusively on the sexual orientation clause.
Again, those in opposition argued that the Bill granted special status to
homosexuals.135 The most homophobic comments equated homosexuality
with pedophilia, bestiality, necrophilia, kleptomania, drug addiction, alco-
holism, and any other sign of the moral decline of Western civilization that
came to mind.13 A number of members suggested that providing human
rights protection to gays would hamper efforts to control the spread of
AIDS.137 The most common objection was that the amendment would
undermine the privilege of the heterosexual family by condoning homo-
sexuality. Member after member spoke against "equating the homosexual
with the heterosexual lifestyle." 138
Those in favour of the amendment professed their allegiance to the
heterosexual family, and emphasized that the Bill provided no support to
or condonation of any lifestyle.139 In response to the fervour of the opposi-
tion, the government introduced an amendment on second reading to
clarify this point:
Nothing in this Code shall be interpreted as condoning or condemning any
beliefs, values or lifestyles based upon any characteristic referred to in sub-
section (2).140
However, the amendment had the effect of inflaming the passions of the
opposition who insisted that social policy should condone heterosexuality
and condemn homosexuality. This clause suggested the government
13 Manitoba Debates 1987, 3712 (Roch); 3722, 3988 (Rocan); 3727, 3980 (Derkach);
3961 (Mitchelson); 3971 (Kovnats); 3977 (Ducharme); 3944 (Orchard).
136 Ibid. at 3707 (Ernst); 3713 (Roch); 3723 (Rocan); 3981 (Derkach).
137 Ibid. at 3709 (Ernst); 3714 (Roch); 3723 (Rocan); 3725,3979 (Findlay); 3726 (Pan-
kratz); 3728 (Derkach); 3992-4 (Orchard); 3995 (McCrae).
138 Ibid. at 3707-9 (Ernst); 3711-2,3981 (Walding); 3712-4 (Roch); 3718-9,3989 (Cum-
mings); 3721-2 (Scott); 3724-5,3978-9 (Findlay); 3726 (Pankratz); 3727-8,3979-80
(Derkach); 3975-6 (Manness); 3977 (Ducharme); 3977 (Brown); 3982 (Blake);
3986 (Connery); 3987-8 (Rocan); 3992-4 (Orchard); 3995-6 (McCrae); 3999-4000
(Filmon).
139 Ibid. at 3715,3718,3960,3982 (Ashton); 3957-8 (Baker); 3958-9 (Desjardins); 3959
(Santos); 3961 (Carstairs); 3962 (Mackling); 3962, 4001 (Pawley); 3905 (Ha-
rapiak); 3966 (Schroeder); 3968 (Waslycia-Leis); 3970 (Storie); 3971-2 (Scott);
3971 (Smith); 3972 (Hemphill); 3973 (Doer); 3998-9 (Walding).
140 Ibid. at 3957. Now S.M. 1987, c.45, s.9(5). In addition, section 9(4) was added to
the Code to reassure those members who had trouble distinguishing homosex-
uality from sexual assault "For the purpose of dealing with any case of alleged
discrimination under this Code, no characteristic referred to in subsection (2)
shall be interpreted to extend to any conduct prohibited by the Criminal Code of
Canada."
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should do neither.1 41 Several members of the government condemned the
hate and myths propagated by the opposition, and suggested that the tone
of the debate was the best proof of the need for a prohibition on discrimina-
tion against gays and lesbians.142 The opposition reacted angrily to the
suggestion that their position was founded on hate and ignorance.1 43
In fact, the opponents in the debates relied on grotesque stereotypes of
gay and lesbian people. Becki Ross described her experience sitting
through the Ontario debates on Bill 7 as follows:
My life was rendered an abstraction. I could not locate myself inside the
repeatedly stated category, "homosexual"... In the House I felt battered and
stretched apart, tossed about on a stormy sea, a vessel rubbed raw. I felt angry,
hated and ridiculed. JUDGMENT DAY. It was obvious that my loving women
was dangerous, and that this loving was clearly under attack (though the
attack was not unfamiliar to me). That I live, with my family, differently, at the
margins, without social approval, with fear, without safeness, is not found on
the state agenda.)"
Although the notion that homosexuality is an illness needing to be cured
has faded since the late 1960s, the opponents labelled gays and lesbians
deviant by associating them with socially unacceptable behaviour such as
the sexual abuse of children. In fact, sexual abuse of children is a gender
crime, not a sexual orientation crime. The victims of sexual assault are
overwhelmingly female and the perpetrators are overwhelmingly male.145
The Badgley Report found that 97% to 99% of sexual assaults against
children and youth are committed by adult men,1 46 and that three out of
four victims of child sexual abuse are girls.147 In the face of these facts,
casting blame for the tragedy of child abuse on the homosexual "other"
involves, at best, ignorance, or, at worst, a wilful refusal to confront the fact
141 Ibid. at 3958 (Orchard; Manness); 3958, 3985 (McCrae); 3960 (Walding); 3962
(Filmon); 3962-3 (Johnston); 3969 (Ernst); 3974 (Birt).
142 Ibid. at 3963 (Kostyra); 3962 (Pawley); 3968-9 (Waslycia-Leis); 3982 (Ashton);
3997-8 (Maloway).
143 Ibid. at 3984 (McCrae) ("we don't hate the sinner, we hate the sin."); 3964 (Birt);
3969 (Ernst); 3979 (Findlay); 3980 (Derkach).
144 Ross, "Sexual Dis/Orientation or Playing House: To Be or Not To Be Coded
Human", in S. Stone ed., Lesbians in Canada 133 at 138 (Toronto: Between the
Lines, 1990).
145 Solicitor General of Canada, "Female Victims of Crime", Bulletin 4, Canadian
Urban Victimization Survey (Ottawa: 1985).
146 Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths, Report on Sexual
Offences Against Children in Canada (Badgley Report) (Ottawa: 1984) 213-15. See
also Clark, "Boys Will be Boys: Beyond the Badgley Report" (1986) 2 Can. J.
Women and Law 135.
147 Badgley Report, ibid. at 196-8.
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that sexual victimization of children is perpetrated by men, both inside and
outside of heterosexual families.
In the 1980s, those in favour of human rights protection rejected myths
and stereotypes of the sick or evil homosexual. Nevertheless, as David
Rayside has pointed out, achieving protection against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation "depended on the issue being framed as a
limited one -not raising challenges to traditional family structure and
ideology, not even challenging the moral condemnation of homosex-
uality". 48 The debates in both Manitoba and Ontario took place within a
discourse framed by the assumption that homosexuality is an unfortunate
and pitiful condition. Although supporters of reform abandoned the ill-
ness metaphor, they continued to suggest that society, the family, nature or
biology had somehow failed gays and lesbians. For example, Schroeder
stated:
I must admit I hope that my children will grow up heterosexual, but we all
know people who haven't. Whether it is something social or genetic or what-
ever that makes them different in terms of sexual orientation, I don't know.149
And in Premier David Peterson's words:
But then I say to myself:. "Supposing that when one of my children was 16 or
18 he came to me and said: 'Dad, I am a homosexual,'what would I do then?
Would I give my child some of the speeches we have heard in this House in
the past six days and throw him out the door?" Obviously, I would be con-
cefned. Obviously, there would be repercussions. Obviously, I would look at
myself and ask, "What did I do wrong?"
My guess is that most of us, after we had got over the shock, would
embrace that child and try to incorporate him into our own family.150
Heterosexuality continued to provide the measure of normality, and all
deviations from it continued to be seen as unnatural or perverse. As Ross
has pointed out, "there was no discussion on the floor of the taken-for-
granted ways in which people's lives are ideologically and materially orga-
nized as heterosexual."15s In the two legislatures, not one member identi-
fied himself or herself as gay or lesbian. Indeed, many members took care
to emphasize their affiliation with a church or a heterosexual family. Gays
and lesbians, once again, became the invisible other.
All of these features of the debates are an indication of the lack of political
148 Rayside, "Gay Rights and Family Values: The Passage of Bill 7 in Ontario"
(1988) 26 Studies in Pol. Econ. 109 at 139.
149 Supra note 135 at 3966.
150 Supra note 127 at 3857.
151 Ross, supra note 144 at 137.
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power of gays and lesbians. Self-identification as gay or lesbian carries
enormous social, economic and political risks. And even heterosexually-
identified politicians rarely risk affirming the value of gay and lesbian
lives. As a result, reform has taken place within a compassion/
condonation discourse that simultaneously affirms the superiority of het-
erosexuality and the inferiority of homosexuality.
The principal issue in the Ontario and Manitoba debates was whether
adding sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination "pro-
motes or condones a homosexual lifestyle". Traditionally, the law has
avoided any such condonation or promotion through silence and criminal
stigmatization. By providing protection against discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, is the law "promoting a homosexual lifestyle"?
First of all, the notion of there being a "lifestyle" associated with any
particular sexual identity is ludicrous. Heterosexuals, bisexuals, gays, les-
bians are categories that describe people with diverse lives, sexually and
otherwise, and who are further differentiated by race, class, gender, age
and ability. The "lifestyle" notion seems to reflect both stereotypical views
of gays and lesbians and an authoritarian belief that everyone should live
in a monogamous, nuclear, patriarchal, heterosexual family unit.
Including a personal characteristic as an enumerated ground in human
rights legislation represents a judgment that that characteristic is presump-
tively unrelated to a person's merits and capacities. Like other enumerated
grounds such as sex, race, religion and ethnicity, it ought not to form the
basis for determining the distribution of burdens and benefits by the state.
As we have seen in Part I, at the moment a wide range of benefits are
accorded to heterosexuals on the basis of their sexual orientation. Our law
promotes and condones heterosexuality at the expense of other sexual
identities and thereby grants it a privileged, special status. In a heterosexist
society, the purpose of prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is not to "promote homosexuality", but to remove heterosexual
privilege.
For example, providing protection against discrimination based on reli-
gion does not promote Judaism. It does mean that the state or individuals
providing public services cannot initiate policies that promote Christianity
or Christians at the expense of members of other religious groups. Sim-
ilarly, adding sexual orientation as an enumerated ground means that
special privileges cannot be granted to heterosexuals solely because of
their sexual identity. Human rights legislation requires that a person's
religion or sexual orientation be treated as irrelevant factors by individuals
and the state, except where it is necessary to take them into account to
overcome historic or systemic disadvantage, or to accommodate diffe-
rences in a manner that promotes equality.
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These are simple human rights notions, but they are nonetheless star-
tling propositions in a society founded on heterosexual supremacy. We live
in a society that promotes heterosexuality at every turn. Clearly, when
opponents of human rights protection for gays and lesbians protest that the
reformers are "promoting homosexuality", what they mean is promoting it
up from legal disadvantage and stigma. And they are right.
III
Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms152 provides as
follows:
15.-(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
On its face, s.15 appears to continue the legal pattern of ignoring the con-
cerns of gay men and lesbians. Sexual orientation is not enumerated as a
prohibited ground of discrimination. In moving testimony before the Joint
Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution in 1980, members of the
Canadian Association of Lesbians and Gay Men had requested that sexual
orientation be included in s.15.153 Some members of the committee re-
sponded predictably to these submissions by indicating they were not
prepared to promote a lifestyle they did not condone.'5 4 In the end, the
committee voted down an amendment that would have added sexual
orientation as an enumerated ground of discrimination. 55 The govern-
ment took the position that s.15 was open-ended and therefore was capable
of prohibiting discrimination on other than the enumerated grounds. It
would be up to the courts to decide what grounds were covered.'5
Five years after the coming into force of the equality rights, it appears
that s.15's silence regarding sexual orientation will not result in its exclu-
sion as a prohibited ground of discrimination. The general approach to the
interpretation of equality rights set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia'57 and R. v. Turpinlss indicates that
152 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c.11.
153 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee on the Constitu-
tion, 24:22-29 (1980).
154 Ibid. at 24:29-32 (Epp) and 24:38-41 (Mackasey).
153 Ibid. at 48:34.
156 Ibid. at 36:14-5 and 48:31-3.
155 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
158 [19891 1 S.C.R. 1296.
1990]
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW
s.15 has the potential to pose a significant challenge to the legal construc-
tion of heterosexual privilege.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the purpose of s.15 is to remedy or
prevent discrimination against groups suffering social, political and legal
disadvantage in our society.159 To establish a violation of s.15, one must
follow a two-step process. First, one must establish a violation of one of the
four basic equality rights guaranteed by s.15.160 That is, one must show that
one has been deprived of one's right to equality before the law, equality
under the law, the equal protection of the law, or the equal benefit of the
law. The Supreme Court has yet to define the meaning of each of these
rights. McIntyre J., writing for a majority of the Court in Andrews, ex-
pressed the general goal of the four equality rights as follows:
... the admittedly unattainable ideal should be that a law expressed to bind
all should not because of irrelevant personal differences have a more burden-
some or less beneficial impact on one than another.161
And in Turpin, Wilson J. provided the following definition of equality
before the law:
The guarantee of equality before the law is designed to advance the value that
all persons be subject to the equal demands and burdens of the law and not
suffer any greater disability in the substance and application of the law than
others.162
Thus, a law violates the guarantee of equality before the law if it works to
an individual's disadvantage by denying an opportunity to that individual
which is available to others.163 It appears that any law that operates "more
harshly"1 64 on gays and lesbians than it does on heterosexuals will violate
equality before the law.
The second step is to establish that the impact of the law is discrimina-
tory.65 The Court has adopted the following definition of discrimination
put forward by McIntyre J. in Andrews:
... discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or
not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual
or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvan-
tages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which with-
159 Ibid. at 1333.
160 Ibid. at 1325.
161 Supra note 157 at 165.
162 Supra note 158 at 1329.
163 Ibid. at 1329.
164 Ibid. at 1329-30, adopting the test set out in R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282.
165 Supra note 157 at 182.
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holds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to
other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics at-
tributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will
rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individ-
ual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.166
Excluding gays and lesbians from the legislative benefits conferred on
heterosexuals arguably constitutes discrimination according to this defini-
tion. In fact, legislation that accords benefits only to heterosexuals is a
quintessential example of withholding benefits based on group status
rather than individual merits and capacities.
The protection afforded by s.15 is available to those groups suffering
discrimination on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground. To
decide whether a group discriminated against on a non-enumerated
ground can claim the protection of s.15, the court set out the features of the
enumerated grounds that explain their inclusion as prohibited grounds of
discrimination, and then assessed whether a non-enumerated ground
shares a sufficient number of those features so as to be classified as analo-
gous.
A number of features of the enumerated grounds have been identified by
the Supreme Court. First, the groups defined by the enumerated grounds
are disadvantaged groups in that they have suffered a history of discrimi-
nation and are relatively politically powerless. In McIntyre J.'s words, the
enumerated grounds correspond to "socially destructive and historically
practised bases of discrimination." 167 Wilson J. emphasized that a deter-
mination of whether a group falls into an analogous category is to be made
"in the context of the place of the group in the entire social, political and
legal fabric of society."168 Thus, a finding of discrimination will "neces-
sarily entail a search for disadvantage that exists apart from and indepen-
dent of the particular legal distinction being challenged."' 169
The groups afforded protection by s.15 are disadvantaged by a relative
lack of political power. McIntyre J. recognized non-citizenship as an analo-
gous ground of discrimination, noting that non-dtizens are "a good exam-
ple of a discrete and insular minority."170 And La Forest J. noted that "non-
citizens are an example without parallel of a group of persons who are
166 Ibid. at 174-5.
167 Andrews, supra note 157 at 175.
168 Ibid. at 152; Turpin, supra note 158 at 1331.
169 Ibid. at 1332.
170 Andrews, supra note 157 at 183.
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relatively powerless politically, and whose interests are likely to be com-
promised by legislative decisions." 171
The Court has made it clear that as a precondition to the invocation of
s.15, an individual must be a member of a group that has suffered social,
political and legal disadvantage apart from and in addition to the law in
question. Based on this reasoning, it has rejected s.15 claims brought by
injured workers and their dependents, 72 criminal defendants outside of
Alberta, 173 and individuals claiming relief against the federal Crown.174
In addition to the Court's emphasis on the enumerated grounds as the
historical basis of the production of group disadvantage, La Forest J. in
Andrews pointed out two additional features of non-citizenship that, in his
view, qualified it as an analogous ground. One is that non-citizenship bears
no relation to an individual's ability to perform or contribute to society.175
Another is that non-citizenship is an "immutable" characteristic, "typically
not within the control of the individual" and "at least temporarily, a charac-
teristic of personhood not alterable except on the basis of unacceptable
costs."1 76
A consensus has emerged that sexual orientation is an analogous ground
of discrimination prohibited by s.15 of the Charter. The Parliamentary
Committee on Equality Rights concluded that "sexual orientation should
be read into the general open-ended language of section 15 of the Charter
as a constitutionally prohibited ground of discrimination", a position that
is shared by the federal government. 177 In the absence of any serious argu-
171 Ibid. at 195. Wilson J. also found (at 152) that non-citizens are an analogous
group 'lacking in political power and as such vulnerable to having their inter-
ests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect violated."
172 Reference re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld.), [19891 1 S.C.R. 922.
173 Turpin, supra note 158.
174 Rudolph Wolff and Co. v. Canada, unreported, March 29, 1990.
175 Supra note 157 at 197.
176 Ibid. at 195.
177 Supra note 9 at 29. The federal government's position is set out in Toward Equal-
ity, supra note 89 at 13: "The Department of Justice is of the view that the courts
will find that sexual orientation is encompassed by the guarantees of s.15 of the
Charter". The federal government has not had the political courage to take any
responsibility for the promotion of equality for gays and lesbians, preferring
instead to cast responsibility on the courts and the Charter. Indeed, Justice
Minister Kim Campbell recently justified the government's persistent refusal to
add sexual orientation to the Canadian Human Rights Act on the grounds that the
Charter somehow rendered it unnecessary: "... the government's commitment
in 1986 with respect to sexual orientation was to do whatever is required. The
government has taken the position that it is covered by Section 15 of the Char-
ter." Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 8, 1990, at 9005.
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ment that gays and lesbians do not constitute a disadvantaged group, the
issue has been conceded in argument before the courts.
17
There can be little doubt that "a search for indicia of discrimination such
as stereotyping, historical disadvantage or vulnerability to political and
social prejudice" will yield the conclusion that gays and lesbians are de-
serving of the protection of s.15.179 I have surveyed in Part I of this paper
the hatred, violence and legal discrimination directed at gays and lesbians.
The scarcity of legislative representatives willing to forego the privilege
and risk the backlash that comes with abandoning heterosexual identifica-
tion, evident in the debates described in Part II, is testimony to the relative
lack of political power of lesbians and gays. And clearly there is no correla-
tion between an individual's sexual orientation and his or her merits and
capacities.
As Didi Herman has pointed out,180 the only feature of the enumerated
and analogous grounds identified by the Supreme Court that is problem-
atic for recognizing sexual orientation as an analogous ground is the notion
of "immutability" referred to by La Forest J. The inclusion of religion as an
enumerated ground, and the recognition of non-citizenship, marital status
and family status as analogous grounds indicates that "immutability"
should not be interpreted literally, or even considered as a precondition to
recognition as an analogous ground. However, in Veysey v. Correctional
Services of Canada,181 Dub6 J. seemed to assume that it was necessary to
establish that a personal characteristic be immutable to qualify for s.15's
protection against discrimination based on that characteristic:
Most of the grounds enumerated in s.15 of the Charter as prohibited grounds
of discrimination connote the attribute of immutability, such as race, national
178 See Veysey v. Correctional Service of Canada, supra note 115; Brown v. British Colum-
bian (Minister of Health), supra note 115.
179 See Parts I and II, supra; Jefferson, "Gay Rights and the Charter" supra, note 86;
Leopold and King, "Compulsory Heterosexuality, Lesbians and the Law: The
Case for Constitutional Protection" (1985) 1 Can. J. Women and Law 163;
Bruner, supra note 86; Girard, "Sexual Orientation as a Human Rights Issue in
Canada 1969-1985" 10:2 Dal. L.J. 267 (1986). For a summary of the law in the
United States, see Note, "Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the
Law" 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1508 (1989). For a strong case recognizing the need to
grant constitutional protection to gay men and lesbians, see Watkins % United
States Army, 837 E2d 1428 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989). See also Girard, "The Protection of the Rights of Homosexuals under the
International Law of Human Rights: European Perspectives" (1986) 3 Can.
Hum. Rts Y.B 3.
180 Herman, "Are We Family? Lesbian Rights and Women's Liberation" (1990) 28:4
Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming).
181 Supra note 115.
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or ethnic origin, colour, age. One's religion may be changed but with some
difficulty; sex and mental or physical disability, with even greater difficulty.
Presumably, sexual orientation would fit within one of these levels of immu-
tability.182
The notion of immutability has some superficial attraction given the view,
dominant from the late nineteenth century through the early 1970s, that
homosexuality is a pathology of the body or the psyche that can be cured.
In the search for a cure, gay and lesbian individuals have been sent to
asylums, subjected to psychotherapy and hypnosis, aversion therapy, elec-
troshock, drugs, and surgical intervention such as castration, hysterectomy
and lobotomy. 83 Such attempts to "cure" gay and lesbian patients by
transforming them into heterosexuals were notoriously unsuccessful,
however, and the illness model of homosexuality has finally been put to
rest.184
Undoubtedly, many lesbians, gays and heterosexuals experience their
sexuality as being set at an early age and determined by forces beyond their
control. But to describe sexuality as immutable is to fail to capture the
complexity and politics of sexual identity. As Herman has argued:
... lesbianism can be expressed politically as well as personally. It may not be
necessary to have intimate sexual relations with women in order to "be a
lesbian" (self-definition plus the rejection of heterosexual privilege might
suffice)... Lesbianism, thus, becomes not only the personal recognition of
oppositional desire; it also constitutes political resistance to heterosexual
hegemony... while it may be true that a heterosexual's sexual identity is not
easily changed, this is not due to an inherent sexuality, but to the context of
enforced and privileged heterosexuality that denies people choice. Notions of
immutability set the homosexual and the heterosexual in a mould that is
politically reactionary in that it denies to heterosexuals the agency to break
out.185
Recognizing the flaws in the immutability argument, some have argued
that the appropriate test for constitutional protection should be whether
182 Ibid. at 78.
183 J. Katz, Gay American History (New York: Crowell, 1976) 129-207. See also Note,
"An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to
Classifications Based on Homosexuality" (1984) 57 S.Cal. L. Rev. 797 at 817-21.
184 The American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its list of
mental disorders in 1973. Coleman, "Changing Approaches to the Treatment of
Homosexuality", in Paul, Weinrich, Gonsiorek and Hotvedt eds., Homosex-
uality: Social, Psychological and Biological Issues (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,
1982) 81-8; R. Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry (New York: Basic
Books, 1987).
185 Herman, supra note 180.
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the characteristic is a fundamental aspect of individual identity such that it
is offensive for the state to seek to alter it. 86 But this reformulation of the
immutability requirement does not escape the objection that the meaning
and import of sexual identity to an individual cannot be detached from the
social construction of heterosexual privilege:
To protect the rights of "the homosexual" would of course be a victory; doing
so, however, because homosexuality is essential to a person's identity is no
liberation, but simply the flip side of the same rigidification of sexual identi-
ties by which our society simultaneously inculcates sexual roles, normalizes
sexual conduct, and vilifies 'faggots'. 187
A more desirable approach to s.15 would be to recognize that discrimina-
tion on the basis of the enumerated and analogous grounds operates in
diverse ways. The enumerated grounds of discrimination in reality share
only one feature in common: they describe personal characteristics that
have been used historically to identify and disadvantage groups perceived
to share the stigmatized characteristic. Apart from this common feature,
the disadvantaged groups identified by the enumerated characteristics
have experienced discrimination in different ways. For example, most of
the characteristics bear no relation to an individual's capacities. Mental or
physical disability, on the other hand, does bear such a relation. The inclu-
sion of mental or physical disability is aimed at overcoming a historical
tendency to undervalue and/or neglect the different merits and capacities
of disabled persons. Similarly, immutability is a characteristic of some of
the enumerated grounds, such as race, colour and national origin. One
enumerated ground, religion, and other analogous grounds recognized in
our human rights jurisprudence, such as marital status, family status, non-
citizenship, and political orientation, are dearly not immutable. For these
reasons, attempts to describe a set of features that are common to all enu-
186 Note, "The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification" (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1285 at 1304; Note, "Sexual Orien-
tation and the Law" supra, note 179 at 1567-8; Watkins v. United States Army, 837
F.2d 1428 at 1446 (9th Cir. 1988) ("immutability may describe those traits that are
so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to
penalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that
change might be physically.").
187 Rubenfeld, "The Right of Privacy" (1989) 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737 at 781. See also
D'Emilio, "Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Poli-
tics and History" (1986) 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 915 at 917 ("central to
the oppression of lesbians and gay men, and to society's ability to shape and
enforce it, are the homosexual and heterosexual categories themselves."); J.
Weeks, Sexuality and Its Discontents, supra note 18 at 198-9.
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merated and analogous grounds (apart from their relationship to historical
disadvantage) are misguided.
For example, we value equal treatment of all religions not because reli-
gion is immutable. It is possible to change one's religion or to avoid reli-
gious persecution by hiding or disguising one's beliefs. Religion is pro-
tected in s.15 because historically it has formed the basis of persecution and
discrimination, and we want to overcome these biases in order to promote
the uninhibited flowering of the human conscience. Asking individuals to
suppress their religious beliefs runs squarely against the purpose of pro-
tecting freedom of religion as a fundamental freedom in s.2(a) of the Char-
ter. The courts have held that religious freedom is violated by any legisla-
tion that has the effect of compelling the abandonment of, or of creating an
inducement to abandon, an essential religious practice.188 And the state is
free to provide education regarding religion, but it must do so in an even-
handed manner, avoiding indoctrination that amounts to the imposition of
majoritarian religious beliefs on minorities.189 Religious freedom is insev-
erably connected to the promotion of religious equality.
Like one's religion, one's sexual orientation can be suppressed or dis-
guised. The cost is the loss of expression of political opposition to the status
quo of institutionalized heterosexuality, and a loss of freedom of choice
regarding intimate association.1 90 Equality for gays and lesbians is hin-
dered by the denial of freedom of expression and association. Thus, like
religion, there is a strong connection between recognizing sexual orienta-
tion as a protected ground of discrimination under s.15 and the fundamen-
tal freedoms in s.2 of the Charter.191 Focusing on the expressive aspects of
lesbian and gay existences directs our attention far more effectively than
immutability does to the nature of legal discrimination. The law tells les-
bians and gays that by not expressing their sexual identities, by not "flaunt-
ing their sexuality", they can avoid legal penalties and social stigma. Pri-
188 R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [19851 1 S.C.R. 295; Edwards Books and Art Ltd. v. The
Queen, [19861 2 S.C.R. 713.
189 Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education, (1988) 52 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Ont. C.A.);
Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Ontario (Education Minister), (1990) 65
D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.); Russow v. British Columbia (Attorney-General), (1989) 62
D.L.R. (4th) 98 (B.C.S.C.).
190 Karst, "The Freedom of Intimate Association" (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 624.
191 The courts have thus far shown little inclination to give freedom of association
meaning in the "private" realm of family relationships: see Catholic Children's
Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. S.(T), (1989) 69 O.R. (2d) 189 (Ont. C.A.);
Thompson, "A Family Law Hitchhiker's Guide to the Charter Galaxy" (1988) 3
Can. Fam. L.Q. 315.
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vate, consensual sexual expression between consenting same-sex adults
has been decriminalized. But a range of social and legal penalties can attach
to public acts of self-identifying expression. Not surprisingly, an important
strategy of the gay and lesbian movement has been to encourage individ-
uals to take the risks and consequences of self-identification, "come out of
the closet", express their sexuality openly, and associate with others in the
struggle for equal rights. As Kenneth Karst has argued regarding Ameri-
can laws criminalizing gay sexuality:
... it seems clear that today one of the chief concerns underlying the mainte-
nance of those laws is a concern to regulate the content of messages about
sexual preference. It is said that the state, by repealing its prohibition on
homosexual conduct, will itself be seen as making a statement approving that
conduct ... The immediate practical effect of such a law's enforcement is thus
to penalize public expression. And that public expression, as I have said, may
be a political act.192
Drawing the connection to the fundamental freedoms of expression and
association allows us to complete the analogy between sexual orientation
and religious freedom/equality. The rights of gays and lesbians are vio-
lated by any legislation that has the effect of compelling the abandonment
of, or of creating an inducement to abandon, the expression of one's sexual
orientation. Laws that confer economic privileges on heterosexuals fall into
this latter category. And the state is free to provide education regarding
sexuality, but it must do so in an even-handed manner, avoiding heterosex-
ual indoctrination.
The foregoing discussion suggests that laws that disadvantage lesbians
and gays, either by privileging heterosexuality or depriving gays and les-
bians of public benefits or opportunities, will violate s.15 of the Charter.
Such laws will be unconstitutional unless they can meet the test of s.1,
which guarantees rights and freedoms "subject to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society." To justify overriding Charter rights and freedoms, a law must be
pursuing a pressing and substantial objective; the means selected must not
be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations, and must impair
as little as possible the right or freedom in question; and, finally, there must
be a proportionality between the severity of the effects on rights and free-
doms and the importance of the legislative objective. 93
The s.1 test confers a great deal of discretion on the judiciary and it is here
that lesbian and gay rights are most vulnerable to being curtailed. For
192 Karst, supra note 190 at 658.
193 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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example, in one case, in response to an argument that a lesbian's exclusion
from a heterosexually-exclusive definition of spouse violated her equality
rights, the judge gave an unelaborated one-line response: "[tihe answer is
found in s.1 of the Charter."194 This is a terse reminder, if one were needed,
that logic does not necessarily determine judicial decision-making.
If governments are conceding that sexual orientation is covered by s.15,
and if it is true that a plethora of heterosexually-exclusive laws contribute
to the disadvantage of gays and lesbians, what purposes will governments
assert to justify these laws under s.1?
The government might assert that it is promoting heterosexuality and
that there is a long moral and religious tradition behind this goal. However,
like a law that seeks to compel observance of Christianity, such a purpose
would not be "pressing and substantial" for the purposes of the Oakes test.
Indeed, it would be "fundamentally repugnant because it would justify the
law upon the very basis which it is attacked for violating" Charter rights.' 95
Inequality cannot be justified by promoting more of it. As Justice Wilson
stated in Turpin:
The argument that s.15 is not violated because departures from its principles
have been widely condoned in the past and that the consequences of finding a
violation would be novel and disturbing is not, in my respectful view, an
acceptable approach to the interpretation of Charter provisions.196
Another uncompelling justification that is offered for the exclusion of
gay and lesbian couples from legal entitlements is the argument of admin-
istrative convenience. 197 On this view, it is conceded that the state has an
interest in recognizing the emotional and economic interdependence of a
variety of living arrangements, but it is argued that the state needs to have
an easily verifiable measure of that interdependence, namely, marriage.
This argument does not explain why such a verifiable measure has not
194 Dohm J. in Anderson v. Luoma, supra, note 57.
195 R. Big M Drug Mart, supra note 188.
196 Supra note 158 at 1328.
197 See Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health), supra note 22 at 265:
Once the traditional context employed under the Act is departed from there are
any number of variations which become possible. The legislation in question
does not single out same sex couples. As I have already stated they are treated
the same way as a multitude of other relationships such as family units consist-
ing of adult siblings, extended as well as various combinations of unrelated
heterosexual or homosexual adults with and without children. In order to make
the scheme under the Act administratively and economically practicable there
needs to be an objective interpretation imposed that will necessarily exclude
some persons. Simplicity and administrative convenience are legitimate con-
cerns for the drafters of this type of legislation...
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been extended to persons living outside the heterosexual family. Nor can it
account for the extension of legal entitlements to cohabiting heterosexuals
notwithstanding the difficulties of verifying the nature and duration of
their relationships. In any case, as Arbour J. stated in Leroux, the exclusion
of common law partners from the definition of spouse in an insurance
contract
... suggests either a legislative oversight or a deliberate choice to use marital
status as a convenient limit to the insurer's exposure. No other plausible
explanation has been offered and none comes to mind. Either way, oversight
or convenience do not constitute a reasonable limit to equality rights.'"-
Perhaps the most commonly asserted justification of heterosexual privi-
lege is that heterosexual families are the natural and desirable arena for
procreation and the raising of children. Thus, the argument would proceed
under s.1, the state has a "pressing and substantial" interest in encouraging
and protecting the formation of heterosexual family units. For example, in
Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health),199 McRae J. rejected Karen Andrews'
challenge to a regulation that had been interpreted as excluding her lover
and her lover's children from the definition of family members for the
purposes of hospital insurance coverage. McRae J. reasoned as follows:
Homosexual couples are not similarly situated to heterosexual couples. Het-
erosexual couples procreate and raise children. They marry or are potential
marriage partners and most importantly they have legal obligations of sup-
port for their children whether born in wedlock or out and for their spouses
pursuant to the Family Law Act.. A same sex partner does not and cannot
have these obligations.200
This reasoning is obviously problematic. For one, the family before the
court consisted of two women raising two children. And, at direct odds
with the Supreme Court's approach to equality, McRae J. has relied on a
history of legal exclusion and disadvantage to justify further disadvantage.
Indeed, McRae J.'s use of the similarly situated test is a good example of
why that test was rejected as a guide to s.15 by the Supreme Court.2 1
Sheppard has succinctly described the problems with the similarly situated
test as
... its conceptual transformation of problems of inequality, domination and
subordination into problems of irrational classification. When applied to
198 Supra note 36 at 715.
199 Supra note 22.
2w Ibid. at 263.
201 Supra, Andrews note 157 at 168 ("the [similarly situated] test cannot be accepted
as a fixed rule or formula for the resolution of equality questions arising under
the Charter.").
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cases involving historically disadvantaged groups, such a doctrine solidifies
a legal ideology that masks the inequalities of power between dominant and
subordinate groups. Equal protection law thereby concerns itself with irra-
tional differential treatment, not with subordinating treatment.202
These problems aside, McRae J.'s view that the state interest in promot-
ing procreation justifies the promotion of the traditional heterosexual fam-
ily deserves examination. The same reasoning has been put forward in a
series of American cases to reject equal protection challenges to the exclu-
sion of same-sex couples from marriage laws. A good example is the fol-
lowing comment of the Washington Supreme Court in Singer v. Hara:20 3
... marriage exists as a protected institution primarily because of societal
values associated with the propagation of the human race. Further, it is ap-
parent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by
their union. Thus the refusal of the state to authorize same sex marriage
results from such impossibility of reproduction rather than from an invidious
discrimination ...204
There are at least three difficulties with the argument that differences in
the capacity to procreate can justify discrimination against same-sex
couples. The first is whether promoting procreation is a sufficiently "press-
ing and substantial" purpose to satisfy the first branch of the s.1 test set out
in Oakes. The state interest in encouraging people to bring babies into an
already over-crowded world is not self-evident. Leaving that issue aside,
another problem is the premise that the ability to procreate is an essential
aspect of marriage. Equally problematic is the assertion that gay and les-
bian couples cannot procreate.
Historically, an ability to procreate has never been a precondition to
capacity to marry. A marriage is voidable in a nullity action if it cannot be
consummated. Consummation is defined as the man experiencing orgasm
202 Sheppard, "Recognition of the Disadvantaging of Women: The Promise of An-
drews v. Law Society of British Columbia" (1989) 35:1 McGill L.J. 207 at 220.
203 Supra note 49.
204 Ibid., 522 P.2d at 1195. See also Adams v. Howerton, supra note 96 (spouse for the
purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act must be a person of the
opposite sex; legislation as interpreted does not violate the equal protection
clause); Baker v. Nelson, supra note 49 (no constitutional violation in interpreting
marriage statute to embrace only traditional heterosexual union; "The institu-
tion of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procrea-
tion and rearing of children within a family is as old as the Book of Genesis" (191
N.W.2d at 186); Jones v. Hallahan, supra note 49 (same); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
325 N.Y.S.2d 499,67 Misc. 2d 982 (1971); B. v. B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974); Corbett
v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33; North v. Matheson, supra note 50.
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while engaging in vaginal intercourse. Women's pleasure has never been a
relevant consideration to the law of marriage.
There are two ways of understanding the consummation rule: it could be
linked to a requirement that at least the possibility of procreation be present
in every marriage, or it could reflect the patriarchal view that male sexual
pleasure, defined narrowly as reaching orgasm during vaginal intercourse,
is the essence of the marital relationship.
An examination of the case law relating to the consummation rule re-
veals that the latter interpretation is correct: the impossibility of procrea-
tion does not render a marriage voidable. Incurable impotence does consti-
tute grounds for a nullity decree; sterility, on the other hand, is irrelevant. A
good example is the 1947 case of Baxter v. Baxter,205 where a husband
sought a decree of nullity on the grounds that his wife refused to engage in
intercourse without a condom. The House of Lords rejected the applica-
tion, stating that
Counsel were unable to cite any authority where the procreation of children
was held to be the test in a nullity suit. On the contrary it was admitted that
the sterility of the husband or the barrenness of the wife was irrelevant.z
The court stated that the true rationale of the consummation rule could be
found in the following quote from a 1681 textbook
So then, it is not the consent of marriage as it relateth to the procreation of
children that is requisite; for it may consist, though the woman be far beyond
that date; but it is the consent, whereby ariseth that conjugal society, which
may have the conjunction of bodies as well as minds, as the general end of the
institution of marriage, is the solace and satisfaction of man." I am content to
adopt these words as my own.2°7
Notwithstanding its antiquated, sexist foundations, this long-established
principle of the English common law has been followed in numerous Cana-
dian and American decisions.208
205 [19481 A.C. 274 (H.L.).
206 Ibid. at 286.
m7 Ibid. at 289, quoting from Lord Stair's Institutions, Book 1 (1681 ed.). See also D.
v. A., (1845) 1 Rob. Ecc. 280 at 296: "Mere incapability, however, of conception is
not a sufficient ground whereon to found a decree of nullity, and alone so clearly
insufficient that it would be a waste of time to discuss an admitted point."
28 H.R Hahlo, supra note 45 at 35-9; Tice v. Tice, [193712 D.L.R. 591 (Ont. CA.) (if
procreation were essential to marriage, "it would follow that every marriage
without issue could be dissolved - a doctrine for which there is no authority"
(at p.592)); Hathaway v. Baldwin, (1953) 9 W.W.R. 331 (B.CS.C.); Hale v. Hale,
[192712 W.W.R. 366,3 D.L.R. 481 (Alta. C.A.); Miller v. Miller, [194711 O.R 213
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If marriage truly were the exclusive preserve of men and women with a
capacity to procreate, then access to the institution would be barred to
infertile men and women. But proof of fertility or of an intention to procre-
ate has not been demanded of prospective marital partners, nor have post-
menopausal women been denied the right to marry.
Moreover, the consummation requirement is not interpreted in a manner
that prohibits a couple from entering a companionate marriage with no
intention of engaging in sexual relations, traditionally defined. An inability
to consummate a relationship renders a marriage voidable. In other words,
an unconsummated marriage continues to exist until it is terminated by a
decree of nullity or divorce. A party who has agreed to or acquiesced in a
marriage with knowledge of the other party's inability or disinterest in
engaging in sexual intercourse will be barred from bringing a nullity ac-
tion. Thus, in Norman v. Norman,2°9 a decree of nullity for non-
consummation was denied to an elderly couple where the court found that
the prime motive for entering the marriage was companionship. In the
judge's words, "ilt is not open to the applicant, having entered what might
be termed a platonic marriage, to complain of the absence of sexual inter-
course."
210
The availability of a decree of nullity for non-consummation no longer
serves any useful purpose given the availability of divorce after one year of
living separate and apart.21 The rule embodies offensive sexist and hetero-
sexist assumptions about men's and women's sexuality - men on top,
women on the bottom, gays and lesbians on the outside. The consumma-
tion rule has no place in a common law that should be applied and devel-
oped by the judiciary in a manner consistent with the equality rights en-
shrined in the Constitution.212
This discussion illustrates that the law of marriage is sufficiently flexible
to accommodate same-sex relationships. For heterosexuals, access to mar-
(Ont. C.A.); Kirschbaum v. Kirschbaum, (1920) 92 N.J. Eq. 7, 111 A. 697; 1hrney v.
Avery, (1921) 92 N.J. Eq. 473, 113 A. 710; Wendel v. Wendel, (1898) 30 App. Div.
447, 52 N.YS. 72; Schroter v. Schroter, (1907) 56 Misc. 69, 106 N.Y.S. 22; Marks v.
Marks, (1948) 191 Misc. 448, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269.
209 (1979) 9 R.F.L. (2d) 345 (Ont. U.F.C.).
210 Ibid.. See also Foster v. Foster, [19531 2 D.L.R. 318 (B.C.S.C.).
211 Divorce Act 1985, S.C. 1986, c.4, s.8(1). The previous Divorce Act (R.S.C. 1970,
C.D-8) permitted a spouse to petition for divorce on the grounds that the mar-
riage had not been consummated (s.4(1)(d)). This provision was not retained In
the 1985 Act. However, non-consummation remains as a basis for a nullity
action at common law. H.R. Hahlo, supra note 45.
212 R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 603.
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riage is not affected by an inability or lack of desire to procreate or engage
in sexual relations. It is only when the courts have been confronted with the
possibility of same-sex marriage that the ability to procreate has been
elevated to an essential condition of the marital relationship.
If the state purpose in promoting marriage as a union between a man and
a woman is to foster procreation, the rule of heterosexual exclusivity is both
over-and under-indusive. The right to marry is protected regardless of its
connection to procreation. Infertile heterosexuals are permitted to marry,
and gay and lesbian couples interested in child-rearing are denied the
right.213 Thus, the rule of heterosexual exclusivity would fail the least
restrictive means branch of the Oakes test.
In sum, the state goal of promoting procreation provides neither a coher-
ent rationale for excluding gay and lesbian life partners from marrying, nor
for heterosexually-exciusive definitions of spouse in other legislative con-
texts. Even if it did, what are we to make of the commonly voiced assertion
that "gays and lesbians cannot procreate"?
Of course, any fertile man or woman has the capacity to procreate in the
sense of contributing genetically to conception that may lead to the birth of
a child. By definition then, infertile persons cannot procreate (without
technological assistance); fertile gays and lesbians can procreate. Many
gays and lesbians have children by adoption, from previous heterosexual
relationships, or by choosing to conceive and ultimately to parent by en-
gaging in heterosexual intercourse or artificial insemination. To state that
gays and lesbians cannot procreate is either to ignore the reality of gay and
lesbian parents, or to exclude parents with primary emotional and/or
sexual attachments to persons of the same sex from the categories "gay and
lesbian."
On closer examination then, the assertion that lesbians and gays cannot
procreate reduces to the following: the act of conception cannot be linked to
the sexual acts of same sex partners absent the genetic and/or reproductive
contribution of an opposite sex third party. The question becomes: does the
state have a valid interest in seeking to promote the linking of procreation
to the sexual acts of two life partners?
I cannot think of any rational reason why relationships should be sanc-
tioned by the state only when the possibility exists for children to be born of
a sexual act between the spouses and thus genetically linked to both par-
ents. After all, we do not penalize the infertile or heterosexuals who choose
not to procreate. Indeed, the removal of legal discrimination against chil-
dren born out of wedock214 and state support of in vitro fertilization and
213 See Note, "Sexual Orientation and the Law" supra, note 179, at 1608-11.
214 E.g., Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.68, s.1.
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artificial insemination for infertile heterosexual couples belies the bona
fides of any such asserted state purpose.215 The state has tolerated the
severance of the link between sexuality and procreation so long as hetero-
sexual dominance has not been threatened.216
An insistence on the linking of procreation and sexuality is an attempt to
rationalize heterosexism by seizing on the distinct feature of heterosexual
relationships and elevating it to the standard with which all other sexu-
alities must comply. Equality requires that differences be accommodated in
a manner that promotes the overcoming of historic disadvantage.217 There-
fore, laws that take into account the fact that procreation is not linked to gay
and lesbian sexuality must do so in a manner that promotes equality.
Refusing to accord any legal support, recognition or legitimacy to same-sex
relationships clearly does not promote equality for lesbians and gays.
A useful parallel can be made to pregnancy discrimination. In the Bliss
case,218 the Supreme Court had upheld a law that disadvantaged pregnant
women on the grounds that "[any inequality between the sexes in this area
is not created by legislation but by nature."219 In Brooks v. Canada Safe-
way,220 the Supreme Court overruled Bliss, and recognized that women's
distinctive reproductive role may be based in biology or nature, but that
any inequality flowing from this difference is socially constructed:
That those who bear children and benefit society as a whole thereby should
not be economically or socially disadvantaged seems to bespeak the obvious.
It is only women who bear children; no man can become pregnant ... It is
difficult to conceive that distinctions or discriminations based upon preg-
nancy could ever be regarded as other than discrimination based upon sex, or
that restrictive statutory conditions applicable to pregnant women did not
discriminate against them as women.221
As pregnancy is to sex discrimination, the lack of a connection between
procreation and sexuality is to sexual orientation discrimination. From a
215 E.g., Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Human Artificial Reproduction
and Related Matters (1985).
216 Coffey, "Of Father Born: A Lesbian Feminist Critique of the Ontario Law Re-
form Commission's Recommendations on Artificial Insemination" (1986) 1
Can. J. Women and Law 424; Lahey, "The Criminal 'Justice' System and Repro-
ductive Technologies" (1985) 14:4 Resources for Feminist Research 27.
217 Andrews, supra note 157; Turpin, supra note 158; C. MacKinnon, "Difference and
Dominance" in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987) 32; Sheppard, supra note 202.
218 Bliss v. A.-G. Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
219 Ibid. at 190.
220 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.
221 Ibid. at 1243-4.
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male, heterosexual perspective, both are biological differences that have
been used to rationalize and justify disadvantage. Section 15 requires that
such distinct features of members of disadvantaged groups be accommo-
dated in a manner that promotes equality.
IV
I have reviewed the myriad ways in which lesbians and gays are legally
deprived of rights, benefits and full social participation. We have seen that
heterosexism is rationalized by legislators and judges by reference to a
compassion/condonation dichotomy that reflects the stigmatization flow-
ing from criminalization, legal exclusion and the lingering influence of the
once-dominant illness model of homosexuality. We have also seen that
logically conpelling arguments can be made that these laws promoting
heterosexuality or disadvantaging gays and lesbians are unconstitutional
as a violation of s.15 of the Charter. Should we anticipate that law-makers
will invoke the Charter, and human rights legislation with similar guaran-
tees, to dismantle the legal construction of heterosexual privilege? Experi-
ence would suggest otherwise. It seems unlikely, to say the least, that the
complete absence of positive images of lesbians and gays in Canadian
legislation and judicial decisions will suddenly be replaced by a new
equality-based approach. Thus, when considering the promotion of equal-
ity for lesbians and gays, one confronts a palpable tension between consti-
tutional possibilities and predictive probabilities. Nevertheless, several re-
cent decisions have generated some hope that law-makers are prepared to
accord legal recognition to non-heterosexual families.
A broad and functional definition of family was adopted by the New
York Court of Appeals in Braschi v. Stahl Associates.m The issue in the case
was whether a gay man had the right to remain in a rent-controlled apart-
ment that he had shared with his lover until his death. The lease was in the
deceased's name. According to New York's Rent Control regulations, the
landlord could evict Braschi unless he was "either the surviving spouse of
the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family
who has been living with the tenant".
The majority of the court found that Braschi was a family member of his
deceased lover:
The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious
legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in
the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and
certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners
222 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
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whose relationship is long-term and characterized by an emotional and fi-
nancial commitment and interdependence. This view comports both with
our society's traditional concept of "family" and with the expectations of
individuals who live in such nuclear units...
In the majority's view, family membership
should be based on an objective examination of the relationship of the parties.
In making this assessment, the lower courts of this State have looked to a
number of factors, including the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship,
the level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the
parties have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to soci-
ety, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily family services... it is
the totality of the relationship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-
sacrifice of the parties which should, in the final analysis, control.224
The first Canadian decision to find that exclusively heterosexual spousal
benefits violate human rights is the decision of the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal in Mossop v. Department of Secretany of State,2 S recently
overturned on judicial review by the Federal Court of Appeal.226 Brian
Mossop was denied bereavement leave to attend the funeral of his gay
lover's father. The collective agreement granted paid leave to common law
spouses, defined as cohabiting heterosexuals who had lived together for at
least one year. Mossop and his lover had lived together for nine years. As
sexual orientation is not a prohibited ground of discrimination in the Cana-
dian Human Rights Act, he argued that he was discriminated against on
the basis of his family status. "Family status" is not defined by the Act. The
legislative history indicates that Parliament preferred to leave the meaning
of "family status" to be determined by tribunals and the courts.227
Counsel for the Treasury Board referred vaguely to "certain traditional
values" in arguing that the meaning of the family is "generally under-
223 Ibid. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53-4, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788-9.
224 Ibid. at 212-5, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790. For a critical comment on
Braschi, see Esseks, "Redefining the Family" (1990) 25 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. Lib. L.
Rev. 183.
There is increasing support in Canadian law for the view that housing rights
and zoning regulations cannot be based on personal characteristics: Bell v. The
Queen, [197912 S.C.R. 212; Himel, "We Are (Not) Family: Zoning by-Laws and
Reasonableness - A Comment on Bell" (1980) 1 S.C.L.R. 367; Schaap v. Canada
(Canadian Anned Forces, supra note 21; Canadian Mental Health Association v.
Winnipeg, Unreported decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, April 24,1990.
225 Supra note 29.
226 Supra note 29.
227 Ibid. at D/6081-4.
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stood".228 He suggested that Mossop and his lover should be excluded
from the definition of family because their sexuality is not linked to pro-
creation. He seemed to imply that only privileged, heterosexual family
units are deserving of protection from discrimination on the basis of family
status.229 The tribunal rejected such a heterosexually-exclusive notion of
family in favour of the "functional approach" advocated by counsel for the
Commission:
The possibilities inherent in the term family are many, and complex... In the
Tribunal's view, the test of "general understanding" must be rejected, quite
apart from its majoritarian aspects, because it cannot be ascertained with any
degree of confidence... the Act does not promote certain types of status over
others and that the Act is intended to address group stereotypes. For these
reasons, theTribunal finds that it is reasonable to conclude that homosexual
couples may constitute a family.:'
In the result, the tribunal found that the collective agreement discriminated
on the basis of family status, and ordered that the day of leave taken by
Mossop be designated a day of paid bereavement leave.
The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the tribunal's decision on judicial
review.231 Marceau J.A., who wrote the principal judgment for a unani-
mous bench, argued that the "basic concept" of family is a group of indi-
viduals related by blood, marriage or adoption.232 He rejected the "func-
tional" approach to the definition of family adopted by the Tribunal in
favour of a "legal" approach:
It seems to me that what was done by the Tribunal was to take some attributes
usually ascribed to families, such as mutual love between members, mutual
assistance, joint residence, emotional support, sharing of domestic tasks, sex-
ual relations, and treat them as being the essence of the concept itself being
signified. There is a difference between being, in certain respects, functionally
akin to a family and being a family... I fail to see how any approach other
than a legal one could lead to a proper understanding of what is meant by the
phrase "family status". Even if we were to accept that two homosexual lovers
can constitute "sociologically speaking" a sort of family, it is certainly not one
which is now recognized by law as giving its members special rights and
obligations.23 3
28 Ibid. at D/6091.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid. at D/6092 and D/6094.
231 Supra note 29.
232 Ibid. at 15-6.
233 Ibid. at 16-7.
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Like McRae J. in Andrews v. Ontario,234 Marceau J.A. relied upon a history of
legislative exclusion of lesbian and gay relationships to justify further dis-
advantage by exclusion. Consequently, he interpreted family status in a
manner that can only serve to further entrench the privilege of the hetero-
sexual family.
Even if the Mossop decision is not reversed by the Supreme Court of
Canada on appeal, its reasoning will not affect the interpretation of dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation prohibited by the Charter and
by Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and Yukon human rights legislation. In-
deed, Marceau J.A. suggested that the real issue raised by Mossop's com-
plaint was discrimination based on sexual orientation. In his view, since
Parliament had not amended the Canadian Human Rights Act to prohibit
discrimination on that ground, it was not "appropriate for tribunals or
courts to preempt the legislative process." 235
The first case to hold that discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion is prohibited by s.15 is Veysey v. The Commissioner of Correctional Ser-
vice.236 T"Imothy Veysey, an inmate in a federal penitentiary, successfully
challenged the refusal of the prison authorities to allow him to participate
in the Private Family Visiting Program with his gay lover.
The program was set up by a Commissioner's Directive 237 issued under
the authority of the Penitentiary Act.238 Inmates eligible to participate are
entitled to extended private visits with members of their families. The
stated goals of the program are "the maintenance of family ties and the
preparation of inmates for their return to life in the community outside the
penitentiaries." 239 According to the program:
Relatives approved for private visits include the inmate's spouse, common-
law partner, children, parents, foster-parents, siblings, grandparents and in-
laws.24o
Veysey's request to participate in the program with his lover was denied
on the grounds that "existing policy does not support your wish to have the
234 Supra note 22.
235 Supra note 29 at 22. See also the concurring opinion of Stone J.A., at 4-5, rejecting
the argument that the Charter's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation requires that family status be interpreted in a manner that
encompasses same-sex partners.
236 Supra note 115.
237 Commissioner's Directive 770, January 1, 1987.
238 R.S.C. 1985, c.P-5, s.37(3).
239 Supra note 115 at 75.
240 Regional Instruction 771, Deputy Commissioner, Ontario Region, August 29,
1988, paragraph 3.
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private family program extended to common-law partners of the same
sex." 241 Veysey then challenged this decision in court, arguing that he had
been discriminated against solely on the basis of sexual orientation.
Justice Dub6 had no difficulty reaching the conclusion that sexual orien-
tation is a ground of discrimination analogous to those enumerated in
s.15.242 In his words, persons who have deviated from sexual norms "have
been victimized and stigmatized throughout history because of prejudice,
mostly based on fear and ignorance, as most prejudices are." Having
reached this conclusion, it followed that Veysey's exclusion from the pro-
gram violated his equality rights.243
Nor did Dub6 J. consider that there was any argument that the exclusion
of same-sex partners could be justified under s.1 of the Charter:.
Bearing in mind that a goal of the program is the preparation of inmates for
their return to life in the community through the preservation of their most
supportive relationships, this desirable goal is not furthered by denying the
applicant's access to his most supportive relationship. Obviously, the suc-
cessful reintegration into the community of this inmate would be a benefit not
only to him, but to the community as a whole.2"
On appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, the court affirmed that Veysey
had a right to be considered for participation in the program.245 The court
concluded that, as a matter of legal interpretation, the expression "common
law partner" in the Directive includes partners of the same sex. The court
could have held that this result was required by the Charter of Rights, but
chose instead to give relief to Veysey on the narrowest possible grounds:
... we express no opinion on those [constitutional] aspects of the judgment
below except to say that Counsel for the Appellant has formally informed us
that it is the position of the Attorney General of Canada that sexual orienta-
tion is a ground covered by section 15 of the Charter.246
Indeed, the discomfort of the court with the broader implications of the
issue is patent in its creative avoidance of rendering a decision that would
have created a precedent on either the scope of gay and lesbian rights
under the Charter or on the interpretation of the word "spouse" in other
legislation. The court noted that the words "common law partner" were a
241 Supra note 115 at 75.
242 Accord: Brown v. British Columbia Minister of Health, supra note 115.
243 Supra note 115 at 78.
244 Ibid. at 79.
245 Supra note 115.
246 ibid. at 6.
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"novelty" that "have never been used, in our knowledge, in any other
statutory document." 247 Accordingly,
We do not, in this case, have to decide whether or not common-law partners
of the same sex are common-law spouses and we refrain from expressing any
view on that issue. We are dealing with very special and unusual expressions
found in a unique document obviously not drafted by legal experts and
directed at a specific program of integration of inmates in society.248
The Veysey and Braschi decisions, and the tribunal decision in Mossop, all
represent positive steps forward, if only small steps, in removing the privi-
lege of the heterosexual family and in fostering a plurality of sexual and
familial arrangements. The decisions mark at least some progress in the
tolerance of same-sex relationships. For example, both the trial and appel-
late decisions in Veysey recognized that allowing a prisoner to maintain
contact with his gay partner for the duration of his imprisonment would
further his reintegration into society upon his release. The courts thus
abandoned heterosexist assumptions that would have denied that gay
relationships are a valuable part of the social fabric.
Nevertheless, the decisions fit comfortably into heterosexist discourse
framed by the compassion/condonation dichotomy. Viewed in the overall
legal context outlined in this paper, the results of these cases do not chal-
lenge the central institutions of heterosexual privilege. The Veysey case
arose in an already marginal social context (prisons) and the Federal Court
of Appeal was careful to confine its reasoning to that context. One would
have to be hard-hearted to deny Braschi the right to remain in the apart-
ment he shared with his deceased partner. On the other hand, marriage, the
ideological centrepiece of heterosexual supremacy, has thus far been im-
mune to transformation. And, at the time of writing, following the Federal
Court of Appeal decision in Mossop, statutes or employment policies that
provide material benefits exclusively to heterosexual families have yet to
be successfully challenged in Canada.249
One would think that the state has an interest in promoting and preserv-
ing the formation of any families that are capable of performing functions
traditionally associated with family life, such as the socialization and rear-
ing of children, the organization of consumption and household produc-
tion, and the provision of care and emotional support, particularly in times
of unemployment, illness and other adversity. These functions are increas-
247 Ibid. at 4.
248 Ibid.
249 In addition to the Mossop decision, see Andrews v. Ontario, supra, note 22; Vogel v.
Government of Manitoba, supra, note 29; Re Carleton University, supra, note 29.
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ingly being performed in families that do not fit the traditional married,
heterosexual mould.
However, where legislation has extended rights and obligations to non-
traditional families, it has not departed from heterosexual exclusivity. Un-
married cohabiting heterosexuals have obtained some legal recognition,
resulting largely from the state's desire to relieve itself of the burden of
family support and breakdown. For example, the definition of "spouse" in
the Ontario Family Law Act and the Succession Law Reform Act were ex-
panded to include cohabiting unmarried heterosexuals for the purposes of
claiming support from a spouse or a spouse's estate, while for other pur-
poses, such as entitlements to property, the definition was left unchanged.
The state, clearly, has a special interest in broadening obligations and struc-
tures of mutual care, and thereby further privatizing those costs. Further-
more, bringing relationships within the disciplinary and regulatory pur-
view of the law diminishes the threat to the status quo posed by "outlaw"
communities. In these ways, the state has an interest in according legal
recognition to gay, lesbian and other family forms.250
Attempts at reform have not yet been able to crack the walls of heterosex-
ual privilege. As many lesbian and gay couples are determined to achieve
the legitimacy and material benefits they are currently denied, the legal
hegemony of the heterosexual family will continue to be challenged. How-
ever, Canadian law will not move beyond the compassion/condonation
approach to lesbian and gay existences until lawmakers are prepared to
confront and examine heterosexual privilege. At the moment, judges and
legislators have demonstrated a marked inability or unwillingness to ac-
knowledge the social and legal construction of sexual difference as hier-
archy. Instead, using arguments similar to those that have been used histor-
ically to rationalize sex inequality, they have appealed to nature, tradition,
biology or a history of legal exclusion of lesbians and gays to place hetero-
sexual privilege beyond question.25'
250 As the editors of the Harvard Law Review put it:. "To the extent that marriage is
a vehicle for stability because of the commitment it embodies, gay men and
lesbians in stable, committed relationships should no less be entitled to marry
than their heterosexual counterparts." Note, "Sexual Orientation and the Law"
supra, note 179 at 1608. For similar arguments see Veitch, "The Essence of Mar-
riage-A Comment on the Homosexual Challenge" (1976) Anglo-American L.
Rev. 41; Sullivan, "Here Comes the Groom: A (Conservative) Case for Gay
Marriage" New Republic (28 August 1989) 20; Grey, "Eros, Civilization and the
Burger Court" (1980) 43 Law and Contemporary Problems 83 at 90 ("for the
[gay and lesbian] community to be governed effectively, it must be recognized
as legitimate").
251 See Eaton and Peterson, "Comment on Andrews v. Ontario" (1987-88) 2 Can.J.
Women and Law 421.
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Judges and legislators alike have delayed taking responsibility for re-
form by passing the buck to each other. For legislators, apparently, it is far
easier to say "the Charter made me do it" than to speak out against the
disadvantaging of lesbians and gays. As a result, the political issue has
been transferred to the judiciary, not a group renowned for its inclination to
instigate social change. Judges are predominantly wealthy, white, male,
heterosexually-identified lawyers. As Bakan has argued,
Judges will normally unquestioningly and uncritically rely upon dominant
ideologies in the process of characterizing disputes and interpreting legal
texts. By 'dominant ideologies' I mean the web of premises, frameworks,
images and 'common sense' that are presented as natural, necessary and
beyond question by dominant-knowledge producing institutions ... These
ideologies ... take for granted the desirability of prevailing institutions of
social relations, such as private ownership of property, wage labour, or the
'family', and thus function to legitimate these institutions and establish a
presumption against other forms of social relations.252
It is not surprising, then, that the Federal Court of Appeal indicated, in its
recent decisions in Veysey and Mossop, that it will return the issue to Parlia-
ment wherever possible. Thus, we are caught in a stalemate of silence.
Hafen has said that the "preferred family model based on marriage and
kinship resembles a city under siege: those who are in it want to get out,
while those who are outside it want to get in. ' 25 3 According to Barrett and
McIntosh, the explanation for this paradox lies in heterosexual family priv-
ilege itself:
The iniquities of the family and its appeal are closely related - they are two
sides of the same coin. The benefits of family life depend upon the sufferings
of those who are excluded. The ideal of the family life brings in its train many a
bitter marriage and disappointed parents. If the family were not the only
source of a range of satisfactions, were it not so massively privileged, it would
not be so attractive.2
252 Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What
You Want (Nor What You Need)" (1990) Can. Bar Rev. (forthcoming). For other
analyses of the ideological and institutional limitations on pursuing progressive change
through litigation, see Bakan, "Strange Expectations: A Review of 7vo Theories of
Judicial Review" (1990) 35 McGill L.J. 439; Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the
Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall and Thompson, 1989); Fudge,
"The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities and the Limits to the Use of
Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J.
485; Petter, "The Politics of the Charter" (1986) 8 S. Ct. L. Rev. 473; Glasbeek,
"Some Strategies for an Unlikely Task: The Progressive Uses of Law" (1989) 21
Ottawa L. Rev. 387.
253 Hafen, "The Family as an Entity" (1989) 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 865 at 904.
254 Barrett and McIntosh, supra, note 24 at 132-3.
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There is intense debate in lesbian and gay communities about the desir-
ability of gaining admission to the traditional institutions of heterosex-
uality.255 What is dear is that there will be neither freedom nor equality of
sexual identity until the walls of heterosexual privilege are dismantled,
and lesbians and gay men no longer suffer the assaults of heterosexuality's
natural pretensions.
255 See Herman, supra note 180; Ettelbrick and Stoddard, "Gay Marriage: A Must or
a Bust?" Outlook (Fall 1989) 8; and the debates in Rites (November 1989) 11 and
(February 1990) 8-9.
